可先閱讀相關文章:「從風險溢酬來看股市合理本益比」
本益比的定義很簡單,就是投入的本金是盈餘的幾倍。假如投資人將資金投入到一家公司的股票,本金為一百萬,而該年度屬於該投資人的股份盈餘為十萬,那麼本益比就是十倍,而其倒數為10%,也就是投資一百萬賺到十萬。
講得更複雜一點,假設這家公司市值為一億,該年度盈餘為一千萬,也就是說上面所述的投資人持有該公司10%的股權。而該公司的股價為100元,總股數為一百萬股,因此可以算得每股盈餘(EPS)為10元,所以一般計算本益比其實是以 股價除以美股盈餘,也就是100/10=10(倍)。
要注意的是本益比看的是企業本身的獲利情況,而非股東,因此如果股東想要知道自己的實際獲利,股息配息的部份要看的是殖利率,資本利得的部份則要看股價的報酬率,實際總獲利則是兩者相加。但這邊討論的是企業的價值,因此不考慮股東獲利的部份。
上面這張圖表是今年三月初的情況,或許跟現在已經有了一季的差距,不過沒關係,我只是拿來舉例而已。最中間那一行就是本益比,我們以經濟成長率最高的中國為例,中國股市的本益比為18.46倍,也就是投資一百塊錢到中國的企業可以賺得100/18.46=5.42元的盈餘。聽起來如何?夠吸引人嗎?
當我們來看中國的利率時(如上圖),就會發現中國利率高達6.56%,也就是說如果把錢拿去投資在中國的固定收益商品,以風險極低的情況就能夠獲得6.56%的收益,但投資在中國股市抱著相當大的波動風險,企業本身卻只能有5.42%的盈餘報酬率,這樣一比較之後,中國股市一點都不便宜了,講難聽一點投資中國的風險溢酬竟然是負值(-1.14%)!也就是冒更高的風險卻取得更低了報酬。
BRIC四國大致上都有這樣的問題,尤其是巴西利率高達12.25%,就算是只想取得相同的報酬,股市的本益比也要低到8.2倍以下才夠,更別談還想要獲取更高一點的風險溢酬。我之前在「從風險溢酬來看股市合理本益比」這篇文章已經談過,葛拉漢認為相對於債券的低風險,要投資人承受股市的高風險,報酬就應該至少是債券的三分之四,那麼以12.25%的三分之四,就是16.33%,倒數為6.1,巴西的股市本益比當然很難低到這種程度。
所以如果有一個大戶投資人,手上有個一億美元,他會怎麼投資?拿到巴西去買固定收益的證券至少就有12.25%的報酬(不計匯率),但投資巴西股市卻只有12.08倍的本益比,以倒數來看也就是8.3%的盈餘報酬率,冒風險的確反而報酬更低!此時我們也不計股價所產生的資本利得,把買股票當作定存來看,以高達80%的股息支付率(Dividend Payout Ratio)來看,殖利率也才只有6.64%,看起來相當好,但股息支付率很難這麼高,而且和利率一比更是難看。
所以以這個角度來看,大多數高成長、高利率的新興市場國家,其實股市的吸引力都不是來自於盈餘價值,該看的不是本益比,而是本夢比。如果投資人經過上述的判斷,就會發現唯一能期盼的只剩下股價上漲所產生的資本利得了。很遺憾的是,沒有盈餘為基礎的股市,只有泡沫才會推升股價,而大多數投資人在這種市場中,賺到的只有風險,沒有報酬。
我們再來看一下美國利率0.25%,計入風險溢酬後股市應該要有0.3333%的盈餘報酬率,其倒數也就是本益比,為300倍!當然,美國股市的本益比不太可能高到這種程度,不然S&P 500指數都要上萬點了。但如果一筆資金在美國要尋找投資標的,則股市明顯比固定收益市場還要吸引人。
一個討論指數投資、價值投資與長期投資的美股部落格,介紹全球投資市場的最新訊息、各種投資哲學與資產配置方法
A Long-Term Investor shares his opinions about USA stock market, ETFs, asset allocation, value investing and Index Investing.
2011年7月12日
2011年4月9日
從風險溢酬來看股市合理本益比
葛拉漢(Benjamin Graham)在1974年9/10月號的金融分析師期刊寫下以下這段話:「1964年,最高評等的債券平均利率是4.4%,以我看來,本益比的倒數與債券的利率有關,似乎非常合乎邏輯。當債券的利率是4.4%時,道瓊一美元盈餘的價值為17美元,那麼當最高評等的債券利率是8.5%時,一美元盈餘現在的價值只有17美元的52%,也就是8.8美元。這表示,目前道瓊的本益比九倍是合理的。換個角度來看,我希望道瓊工業指數或標準普爾指數至少將三分之四的盈餘報酬率(=本益比的倒數)回歸給最高評等的債券,讓債券投資具備競爭的吸引力。」
這段話其實我一直回味和思考,若要單獨從這段話引申出去,我可以寫出至少五篇不同角度的討論文章,不過今天暫時把主題集中在其中一個焦點就好。其實簡化來說,如果債券代表的是「無風險投資」(實際情況當然不會是無風險,但至少最高評等美國公債的風險可能低到很難去規避了),那麼其他任何投資資產如果有任何一丁點的風險,就必須要提供足夠的風險溢酬,不然投資人沒有必要冒那些風險把資金投入。那麼,以股市來說,風險溢酬應該是多少呢?
葛拉漢認為相對於債券的低風險,要投資人承受股市的高風險,報酬就應該至少是債券的三分之四,也就是如果債券報酬是3%,股票就至少要有4%。
所以當債券利率為3%的時候,那麼股市盈餘報酬率因為投資人承受了更多的風險,所以要高到4%才算合理,此時盈餘報酬率的倒數,也就是本益比,則為25倍。這並不是用來判斷短期的股市本益比合不合理的方式,因此使用時要小心。
美國債券長期的報酬率約為5%,而美國股市長期的本益比為16倍,因此的確也與葛拉漢認為的情況差不多。有很多人在擔心美國會不會陷入長期低利率的時代,其實上面這個表格正好可以拿來應用。如果利率低,那麼投資人在債券市場長期下來只能拿到較低的報酬,則即使資金投入股市,預期的報酬也不會太高,此時投資人就可以接受比較高的本益比了。
PS:上面這個表格不必算也不必背,利率和本益比相乘都是75,盈餘報酬率則是本益比倒數或是利率的三分之四。
這段話其實我一直回味和思考,若要單獨從這段話引申出去,我可以寫出至少五篇不同角度的討論文章,不過今天暫時把主題集中在其中一個焦點就好。其實簡化來說,如果債券代表的是「無風險投資」(實際情況當然不會是無風險,但至少最高評等美國公債的風險可能低到很難去規避了),那麼其他任何投資資產如果有任何一丁點的風險,就必須要提供足夠的風險溢酬,不然投資人沒有必要冒那些風險把資金投入。那麼,以股市來說,風險溢酬應該是多少呢?
葛拉漢認為相對於債券的低風險,要投資人承受股市的高風險,報酬就應該至少是債券的三分之四,也就是如果債券報酬是3%,股票就至少要有4%。
債券利率 | 股市本益比 | 股市盈餘報酬率 |
4.40% | 17.05 | 5.87% |
8.50% | 8.82 | 11.33% |
1% | 75.00 | 1.33% |
2% | 37.50 | 2.67% |
3% | 25.00 | 4.00% |
4% | 18.75 | 5.33% |
5% | 15.00 | 6.67% |
6% | 12.50 | 8.00% |
7% | 10.71 | 9.33% |
8% | 9.38 | 10.67% |
9% | 8.33 | 12.00% |
10% | 7.50 | 13.33% |
所以當債券利率為3%的時候,那麼股市盈餘報酬率因為投資人承受了更多的風險,所以要高到4%才算合理,此時盈餘報酬率的倒數,也就是本益比,則為25倍。這並不是用來判斷短期的股市本益比合不合理的方式,因此使用時要小心。
美國債券長期的報酬率約為5%,而美國股市長期的本益比為16倍,因此的確也與葛拉漢認為的情況差不多。有很多人在擔心美國會不會陷入長期低利率的時代,其實上面這個表格正好可以拿來應用。如果利率低,那麼投資人在債券市場長期下來只能拿到較低的報酬,則即使資金投入股市,預期的報酬也不會太高,此時投資人就可以接受比較高的本益比了。
PS:上面這個表格不必算也不必背,利率和本益比相乘都是75,盈餘報酬率則是本益比倒數或是利率的三分之四。
2011年4月5日
個股合理價格評估
這篇文章會有引用三種不同的評估方法。
1. 怪老子理財的股票價值試算:這個網站是以股息折現模型(Dividend Discount Model,DDM)來計算出股票的價值,DDM在投資金律作者William Bernstein的幾本著作裡面都不斷提到過讀者應該不陌生才對,這種方法就是把你預期能從這家公司所取得的股息全部加起來,來評估你應該花多少錢來持有這家公司,例如這家公司每年配一元股息,你打算持有一百年,那麼你如果付超過一百元,也就太貴了。這當然是過度簡化了,因為還有兩個變因,一個是每年股息不會都一樣,正常來說股息應該是每年都會成長的,第二個變因則是過一段時間之後,你預期取得的股息的終值和現值會有所不同,時間越久差距越大。因此考量這兩個變因之後,就會獲得DDM的公式:
關於DDM的評估方法,請參考怪老子所寫的「如何評估股票價值」,而這裡主要只是便宜行事使用該網站的試算工具「股票價值試算表」,需要三個資料:今年股息、期望報酬率、預期成長率。試算表如下,我以JNJ公司資料為例:
其中「今年股息」可以從許多管道取得,我這邊以http://www.dividendinvestor.com/的資料為來源,輸入JNJ之後按下Dividends Paid Since按鈕可取得歷史配息資料,我以2010年全年共配息$2.11作為數據。而「期望報酬率」則根據怪老子在「第一次領薪水就該懂的理財方法」書中認為至少要有20%的投資報酬率才算合理,因為投資股票承擔了不少風險。最後,「預期成長率」則同樣查詢http://www.dividendinvestor.com/網站中的資料,其實應該以十年股息成長率為最佳數據,但是該網站只有五年的免費數據,因此我就用「Dividend Growth Rate 5yr Avg」來作為數據,應為10.37%,我取整數為10%。因為JNJ已經是相當成熟的公司,所以並不分成長階段來區分成長率,統一都用10%。試算結果如下:
大家可以看到,股息會因為成長率不斷增加,但是現值卻快速降低,到第35年已經降到0.1元以下,到第70年已經低於0.01元了。而如果最後累積到第一百年,則累計現值就會是23.21,這也就是這個估價方法所算出的合理價值。
2. 第二個方法是來自於「散戶大反擊」一書中的方法,其實也是DDM的應用,只是剛剛是以股息去做計算,這邊則是以EPS做計算,而且考量的比較多。該書作者Phil Town有成立一個網站,就是以該書的原文書名為名:http://www.paybacktime.com/。這網站可以免費註冊,就可以閱讀一些補充文章和作者所提供的工具,包括Excel檔案。不過遺憾的是讀者可能要兩者並用,因為有些東西書裡沒說清楚,有些東西又只有書裡有,只看網站會不知所以然。
這種評估方式要有四種資訊,包括EPS(每股盈餘)、成長率、PE(本益比)、MARR(最低可接受報酬率)。其中MARR其實就是跟怪老子的20%是一樣的,只是Phil Town訂為15%。所以這一項資訊最簡單,而且固定不變。再來就是EPS,這邊用的是TTM EPS,也就是過去一年的盈餘資料,而不是預估盈餘,其實這項資訊也算好找,Google Finance或Yahoo Finance也都有,但Phil Town偏愛用MSN Money,因此這邊就引用JNJ在MSN Money的資訊:
比較麻煩的部份是成長率,Phil Town認為重要的成長率總共有四種:
其中2004年資料不知道為何消失了,所以這邊是從2001年到2011年的資料,也就是長達11年,這在計算的時候要特別小心。這11年間,每股淨值從$7.95成長到$20.66,年化報酬率為9.07%,算是相當不錯的。如果你不知道怎麼算年化報酬率的話,可以用Excel輸入:「=RATE(11,0,-7.95,20.66)」或到http://www.paybacktime.com/網站Calculators中的EPS Growth Rate計算器來算:
同理,也可以在MSN Money中找到Sales營收成長率、Net Income盈餘成長率的數據來源如下圖,而計算出兩個成長率分別為6.04%和8.09%,甚至還可以計算出EPS的年化成長率為9.07%。
最後只剩下「Cash現金流成長率」,不過可惜MSN Money沒有提供十年的資訊,只有五年,如果堅持要十年就要去找財報了。五年資料如下:
同樣進行年化成長率的計算,獲得2.83%的結果。依照Phil Town的說法,應該採用這四個成長率中最低的一個數值為準,才不會太過高估未來的表現,因此JNJ的成長率只有2.83%。但我個人認為JNJ從實際數據來看,成長率其實是相當穩定而優良的,尤其是其餘三個成長率都有6-9%的水準,因此以2.83%來看的確是有點太過保守了。所以Phil Town建議也可以看看分析師的成長率預測,結果是過去五年有6.6%的成長,而未來五年也有5.8%(如下圖),這樣看來2.83%的確是偏低了,所以我就用剩下三個成長率的最低值6%為JNJ未來的成長率。
另外,還可以用兩倍的本益比與成長率相比來看看,本益比為12.3(如上圖),兩倍為24.6,我所決定採用的6%成長率還遠低於兩倍本益比,因此並不會太過高估JNJ。至於本益比,可以採用當下的資料,也可以用過去十年的平均:
可以看到JNJ的本益比逐年下降,現在的12.3其實是相當不錯的。而過去11年的平均為19.13,如果保守一點就用12.3,我這邊則選用平均值19.13。(有留意到的話,股價淨值比也是逐年下降)所以目前為止四個數字都確定了:
最後,使用作者在網站提供的Sticker Price and MOS計算器計算合理價格,共分成四步驟:
其中Sticker Price為計算所得的標價,但作者認為真正好的價格是以標價的一半買進,也就是所謂的安全邊際價格(Margin of Safety,MOS)。至於這個計算器是怎麼運算的,下回有空我再介紹,或是網友們可以先自行探索作者的網站。
因此目前的JNJ股價的確是低於標價,但是距離MOS價格還差得遠了,而且即使金融海嘯時也沒有跌到MOS價格,這樣看來MOS價格的確是相當難得。而這個評估方法是以EPS為資料,跟上一個以股息為資料相比,應該有相當的落差。過去幾年JNJ的股息配發率大約是40%左右,所以如果這兩種評估方法的結果相似,那麼應該也有這樣的比例,而63.13的40%為25.25,的確和23.21沒差多少了。或是反過來推論,23.21的股息應該可以反推出58.025的股價。這樣來看,兩種評估方法就沒有太大的差異了,但應該多找幾家公司來比較看看才說得準,我想應該會隨著公司型態而有很大的差異才是。
根據這兩個方法,則60左右的股價會是JNJ的合理價格,因此目前的股價是合理的。而值得買進的好價格則是25左右,但這樣的價格恐怕是可遇不可求了。最後,也感謝一位網友在去年以電子郵件討論JNJ這家公司時,以截圖的方式提供了JNJ在巴菲特班的評估方法中合理價格為何?這就是第三種方法,但我並不清楚怎麼計算獲得的:
雖然資料時間和現在有些落差,但我想影響不大,而其中的「俗」價,也跟上述方法計算所得沒有太大的差異。這算是近期看完兩本書的一點小記錄,也分享給大家參考一下。
1. 怪老子理財的股票價值試算:這個網站是以股息折現模型(Dividend Discount Model,DDM)來計算出股票的價值,DDM在投資金律作者William Bernstein的幾本著作裡面都不斷提到過讀者應該不陌生才對,這種方法就是把你預期能從這家公司所取得的股息全部加起來,來評估你應該花多少錢來持有這家公司,例如這家公司每年配一元股息,你打算持有一百年,那麼你如果付超過一百元,也就太貴了。這當然是過度簡化了,因為還有兩個變因,一個是每年股息不會都一樣,正常來說股息應該是每年都會成長的,第二個變因則是過一段時間之後,你預期取得的股息的終值和現值會有所不同,時間越久差距越大。因此考量這兩個變因之後,就會獲得DDM的公式:
關於DDM的評估方法,請參考怪老子所寫的「如何評估股票價值」,而這裡主要只是便宜行事使用該網站的試算工具「股票價值試算表」,需要三個資料:今年股息、期望報酬率、預期成長率。試算表如下,我以JNJ公司資料為例:
其中「今年股息」可以從許多管道取得,我這邊以http://www.dividendinvestor.com/的資料為來源,輸入JNJ之後按下Dividends Paid Since按鈕可取得歷史配息資料,我以2010年全年共配息$2.11作為數據。而「期望報酬率」則根據怪老子在「第一次領薪水就該懂的理財方法」書中認為至少要有20%的投資報酬率才算合理,因為投資股票承擔了不少風險。最後,「預期成長率」則同樣查詢http://www.dividendinvestor.com/網站中的資料,其實應該以十年股息成長率為最佳數據,但是該網站只有五年的免費數據,因此我就用「Dividend Growth Rate 5yr Avg」來作為數據,應為10.37%,我取整數為10%。因為JNJ已經是相當成熟的公司,所以並不分成長階段來區分成長率,統一都用10%。試算結果如下:
大家可以看到,股息會因為成長率不斷增加,但是現值卻快速降低,到第35年已經降到0.1元以下,到第70年已經低於0.01元了。而如果最後累積到第一百年,則累計現值就會是23.21,這也就是這個估價方法所算出的合理價值。
2. 第二個方法是來自於「散戶大反擊」一書中的方法,其實也是DDM的應用,只是剛剛是以股息去做計算,這邊則是以EPS做計算,而且考量的比較多。該書作者Phil Town有成立一個網站,就是以該書的原文書名為名:http://www.paybacktime.com/。這網站可以免費註冊,就可以閱讀一些補充文章和作者所提供的工具,包括Excel檔案。不過遺憾的是讀者可能要兩者並用,因為有些東西書裡沒說清楚,有些東西又只有書裡有,只看網站會不知所以然。
這種評估方式要有四種資訊,包括EPS(每股盈餘)、成長率、PE(本益比)、MARR(最低可接受報酬率)。其中MARR其實就是跟怪老子的20%是一樣的,只是Phil Town訂為15%。所以這一項資訊最簡單,而且固定不變。再來就是EPS,這邊用的是TTM EPS,也就是過去一年的盈餘資料,而不是預估盈餘,其實這項資訊也算好找,Google Finance或Yahoo Finance也都有,但Phil Town偏愛用MSN Money,因此這邊就引用JNJ在MSN Money的資訊:
比較麻煩的部份是成長率,Phil Town認為重要的成長率總共有四種:
- BVPS淨值成長率:9.07%
- Sales營收成長率:6.04%
- Net Income盈餘成長率:8.09%
- Cash現金流成長率:2.83%
其中2004年資料不知道為何消失了,所以這邊是從2001年到2011年的資料,也就是長達11年,這在計算的時候要特別小心。這11年間,每股淨值從$7.95成長到$20.66,年化報酬率為9.07%,算是相當不錯的。如果你不知道怎麼算年化報酬率的話,可以用Excel輸入:「=RATE(11,0,-7.95,20.66)」或到http://www.paybacktime.com/網站Calculators中的EPS Growth Rate計算器來算:
同理,也可以在MSN Money中找到Sales營收成長率、Net Income盈餘成長率的數據來源如下圖,而計算出兩個成長率分別為6.04%和8.09%,甚至還可以計算出EPS的年化成長率為9.07%。
最後只剩下「Cash現金流成長率」,不過可惜MSN Money沒有提供十年的資訊,只有五年,如果堅持要十年就要去找財報了。五年資料如下:
同樣進行年化成長率的計算,獲得2.83%的結果。依照Phil Town的說法,應該採用這四個成長率中最低的一個數值為準,才不會太過高估未來的表現,因此JNJ的成長率只有2.83%。但我個人認為JNJ從實際數據來看,成長率其實是相當穩定而優良的,尤其是其餘三個成長率都有6-9%的水準,因此以2.83%來看的確是有點太過保守了。所以Phil Town建議也可以看看分析師的成長率預測,結果是過去五年有6.6%的成長,而未來五年也有5.8%(如下圖),這樣看來2.83%的確是偏低了,所以我就用剩下三個成長率的最低值6%為JNJ未來的成長率。
另外,還可以用兩倍的本益比與成長率相比來看看,本益比為12.3(如上圖),兩倍為24.6,我所決定採用的6%成長率還遠低於兩倍本益比,因此並不會太過高估JNJ。至於本益比,可以採用當下的資料,也可以用過去十年的平均:
可以看到JNJ的本益比逐年下降,現在的12.3其實是相當不錯的。而過去11年的平均為19.13,如果保守一點就用12.3,我這邊則選用平均值19.13。(有留意到的話,股價淨值比也是逐年下降)所以目前為止四個數字都確定了:
- EPS:4.78
- 成長率:6%
- PE:19.13
- MARR:15%
最後,使用作者在網站提供的Sticker Price and MOS計算器計算合理價格,共分成四步驟:
其中Sticker Price為計算所得的標價,但作者認為真正好的價格是以標價的一半買進,也就是所謂的安全邊際價格(Margin of Safety,MOS)。至於這個計算器是怎麼運算的,下回有空我再介紹,或是網友們可以先自行探索作者的網站。
因此目前的JNJ股價的確是低於標價,但是距離MOS價格還差得遠了,而且即使金融海嘯時也沒有跌到MOS價格,這樣看來MOS價格的確是相當難得。而這個評估方法是以EPS為資料,跟上一個以股息為資料相比,應該有相當的落差。過去幾年JNJ的股息配發率大約是40%左右,所以如果這兩種評估方法的結果相似,那麼應該也有這樣的比例,而63.13的40%為25.25,的確和23.21沒差多少了。或是反過來推論,23.21的股息應該可以反推出58.025的股價。這樣來看,兩種評估方法就沒有太大的差異了,但應該多找幾家公司來比較看看才說得準,我想應該會隨著公司型態而有很大的差異才是。
根據這兩個方法,則60左右的股價會是JNJ的合理價格,因此目前的股價是合理的。而值得買進的好價格則是25左右,但這樣的價格恐怕是可遇不可求了。最後,也感謝一位網友在去年以電子郵件討論JNJ這家公司時,以截圖的方式提供了JNJ在巴菲特班的評估方法中合理價格為何?這就是第三種方法,但我並不清楚怎麼計算獲得的:
雖然資料時間和現在有些落差,但我想影響不大,而其中的「俗」價,也跟上述方法計算所得沒有太大的差異。這算是近期看完兩本書的一點小記錄,也分享給大家參考一下。
2010年11月11日
【RSS】Dividends Value
這個網站我曾經介紹過,不過也值得我再介紹一次,並推薦大家訂閱這個Blog的RSS。顧名思義,這個Blog就是以高股息股票為主題,股息當然並不必然是成功投資的主要條件,但是有許多價值型投資人是相當注重股息的,一來是這才是真正的投資報酬,畢竟如果只想賺取資本利得(價差),其實很容易陷入追求股價的走火入魔,再來是股息的持續成長往往就意味著企業的體質維持健全,而股息再投入在經歷過長時間的複利效果之後也往往能帶給投資人相當好的投資報酬。
這個Blog的文章主要可以分成兩大類,一大類是整理出一些高股息個股的清單,例如這篇文章:「10 Dividend Stocks Delivering A Quick Payback」,而另一大類則是針對一些高股息個股進行分析,並給五星級評等,例如這篇文章:「AT&T Inc. (T) Dividend Stock Analysis」。以下則是今年度的一些個股分析文章,黃色部份則是我有在關注的個股,而大家也可以看到這個Blog所給的星級評等,例如AT&T就是5-Star。
接下來介紹一下怎麼閱讀這個Blog的分析報告:
作者會先簡介一下這家公司,然後用四個指標去判斷這家公司的股價是不是處於合理價位,包 括:
- 平均高殖利率股價:例如過去五年平均殖利率為2.5%,而目前每股配息$1.0,那麼算出來的合理股價就是$40。
- 20年貼現現金流股價:計算這個值需要年度EPS、年度美股配息以及本益比。
- 平均本益比:例如過去五年平均本益比為12倍,現在EPS為$3.8,那麼合理股價則是$45.6。
- 葛拉漢常數:葛拉漢認為合理的本益比為15倍,合理的股價淨值比為1.5,而兩者相乘等於22.5稱為葛拉漢常數。如果本益比10倍,但股價淨值比為2.0,兩者相乘等於20,還小於22.5,那麼這檔個股則低於合理股價。一般計算則以EPS和每股有形資產帳面價值(tangible book value)來計算,例如EPS為$6.8,每股有形資產帳面價值為$12.5,那麼合理股價的計算方是就是6.8 X 12.5 X 22.5再開根號,約等於$43.73。
第二部份則有六個評判準則:
- 自由現金流配發率
- 資產負債比
- 關鍵指標
- 股息成長率
- 連續配息成長年數
- 最近四年股息滾動超過15%
而第三部份則是拿配息收入和貨幣市場帳戶的收入作比較,可以想像成殖利率與定存麗綠的比較,而持有AT&T的收益比貨幣市場還好,所以又拿到一顆星,累積起來總共五顆星,因此AT&T的評等為5-Star。
對這個Blog有興趣的投資人,可以考慮訂閱這個RSS:http://dividendsvalue.com/feed/
2010年11月1日
認識ETF的投資風格
晨星亞洲研究部 2010/11/01 10:10
大部份股票型基金經理人會在價值型或成長型的投資策略中,選擇採取一種投資風格。價值型基金的經理人尋找相對便宜的股票,而成長型基金經理人則挑選具有吸引力的優質公司。我們將藉由本文來檢視價值與成長型股票的定義,並且以實例來進行說明這兩類投資風格的ETF。
風格的定義
雖然指數的觀念已存在一段時間了,但是追蹤價值和成長型股票的指數,直到1980年代才開始發展。不論是廣泛或主要指數的定義皆相當簡單,它們將規模落在某個門檻內的所有股票列入指數的編制中。但如果該指數是要特別訴求”風格”的話,那麼這個指數就得運用一些篩選規則,藉以區分價值及成長型股票。在概念上,價值型股票是相對於某些價值衡量結果後,目前交易價格較低的股票;而成長型股票則是多指目前具有盈收快速成長潛力的股票。價值型股票在辨別上相對較容易,一般通常會利用目前股價與該公司過去的歷史財務數據,如盈收或帳面價值等,相比較後所得到的本益比或股價/帳面價值比率來加以界定。
本益比(P/E ratio)的倒數是收益率,也可以視為利率或股票的報酬率。股票收益率與債券殖利率的概念相當接近,只不過並非所有的公司收益都會被當作股息發放給股東。一般認為,一檔股票若有低本益比或高收益率,便意味著該股票具有投資價值並有提供高報酬率的潛力,不過它也可能隱含較高的風險,就像是高殖利率的垃圾債券也通常被認為較具風險性。
另一方面,成長型股票就較難以界定。以時間點的角度來看,成長型股票可用歷史資料來加以評估,例如歷史的銷售數據或盈收成長,而期間該公司股價通常也會上揚以反映強勁的成長前景。另一個更好的方法,是前瞻性的衡量方法,例如採用分析師的盈收或成長預測數字。不過,分析師的預測普遍存在一個問題,那就是分析師認定企業未來成長性的速度會比市場來的慢,所以當公司將會明顯成長時,其股價早已上揚。由於要藉由過去的歷史數字來作預測有相當程度的困難點,因此有人也建議以公司股價的上漲動能,來作為公司成長的領先指標。因為公司成長代表企業的改變,動能就可能會是判斷公司是否正經歷改變的一個不錯的衡量指標。不過,動能一向被認為是與價值或成長截然不同的第三種投資風格。如果將最具有動能的股票都歸類為成長型股票,那麼其餘的價值型股票就會變成是動能不足的股票。然事實上,向來被視為價值型的股票也具有上漲動能,尤其是與商業週期波動有相關的股票。
另一種判斷成長或價值型股票的方式,則是用產業來加以區分。成熟的資本密集型產業通常被視為價值型產業,而科技或是消費產品及消費者服務產業,因為產業趨勢的影響力較大,它們通常被視為成長型產業。價值型公司通常會支付股利,因為該類型公司的成長機會較少,因此不需要大量的新資本投入。成長型公司的盈收報酬比資金成本來的高,所以這類公司通常會將盈收再投資於本身的業務,而不用來發放股利。
四大指數公司採用各種不同的方法來定義價值或成長型股票。羅素(Russell)使用兩個衡量指標(帳面價值/股價的比率,以及分析師的長期成長預測值),而摩根士丹利(MSCI)則採用了八個衡量指標。理想中,這些衡量方法應可切割出各個截然不同,並且之間低度相關,但會與價值或成長等因素高度相關的投資組合。在經過篩選之後,會有三分之一具有最高價值型分數的股票被放置於價值型指數中,而另外三分之一具有最高成長型分數的股票則被納入成長型指數中。而剩下三分之一的股票,同時具有價值和成長兩種特性,就會被分配在兩種指數之間,這樣一來,這些股票會有一部份比重為價值型,而有另一部份比重為成長型。因為在設計上,這些風格指數有重疊的部份,所以之間的相關性也往往較高。在過去的10年間,標準普爾(S&P)風格指數之間的相關性是最高的,而摩根士丹利則是最低的。為了解決這個問題,標準普爾公司修改了它們的衡量方法,在成長衡量要素之中增加動能因子,並推出一組新的風格指數,取名為「純粹」價值型以及成長型指數,這兩個指數並沒有重疊的部份,並且依照股票風格的分數而非股票市值來分配權重。過去10年標準普爾價值型和成長型指數之間的相關性為0.86,而它們的純粹風格型指數的相關係數僅0.70。
長期來看,價值型股票的表現優於成長型股票。除了它們的報酬率稍高外,該類型股票的波動率也較低。在過去的10年中,S&P 500 價值型指數的年化報酬率為1.6%,標準差為16.6%,而S&P 500成長型指數則下跌了2.9%,標準差為17.7%。大量的分析研究亦顯示價值型股票報酬表現較好;而另一方面,僅少數的證據支持成長型股票的投資。不過,對於價值型股票部分的界定,雖然已有清楚明確的共識,但是成長型股票的定義卻仍較模糊不清。事實上,大家往往也將價值股與熱門股來作比較,而熱門股與價值型股票相反,雖然熱門股並不一定會快速成長,但是股價絕對是相當貴的。不過,這並不意味著價值型股票的報酬表現一定會比較好,希望能夠盡量降低風險或投資期間較短的投資人應投資於主要指數產品,而不是投資風格指數產品。
晨星的觀察及建議
雖然成長型股票通常會比價值型股票來的貴,然在過去的10年內,成長型股票的本益比下降的速度卻比價值型股票來的快。這反映了過去10年來,成長型股票在科技泡沫年代的交易比率數字過於膨脹,並且近來長期成長的預測數字有下降的趨勢。
晨星的分析師認為,目前的價值型股票比成長型股票具有吸引力, iShares S&P 500 Value Index (IVE)的交易價格/公平價值(P/F)比率為0.84,而iShare S&P 500 Growth Index(IVW)為0.94。不過,這些分析師也認為S&P 500 成長型指數的成份股素質較高,因為該指數中有50%的投資部位具有寬廣的經濟護城河,而在S&P 500價值型指數中,只有34%具有寬廣經濟護城河。擁有寬廣經濟護城河的企業具備高度競爭力的經濟優勢,並能維持其高於成本的資本報酬率。因此,在成長型指數中有較多具有經濟護城河的公司一點也不讓人意外,因為這些企業持續投資於本身業務,並且能增長自身盈收的能力較高。
目前有幾檔以價值或成長型投資風格為主題的ETF。如果你所要找尋的是涵蓋所有大小市值股票的ETF,你可能會喜愛 iShares Russell 3000 Growth (IWZ)或是iShares Russell 3000 Value (IWW),這兩檔ETF包含了近乎整個股票市場,但僅收取0.25%的費用。我們通常不建議選取混合或搭配不同指數公司的投資風格基金,因為這樣指數的投資標的容易發生不必要的重疊狀況。在大型股部分,我們偏愛Vanguard Growth ETF (VUG)以及Vanguard Value ETF (VTV),這兩檔ETF的費用率為0.15%。雖然各家指數公司界定風格的方法相當類似,但是在中型股和小型股的部分,卻有較明顯的差異。S&P在指數編製的條件上較為嚴格,規定公司須具備足夠的財務能力才能被納入指數中,而未出現獲利的小型公司也往往波動過大。因此,在小型股的部分,我們較推薦iShares S&P SmallCap 600 Growth (IJT)而非 iShares Russell 2000 Growth (IWO)。除此之外,S&P SmallCap 600 Growth也含有較少的成長型股票,而有較多的價值型股票。Russell 2000成份股的平均市值也小於S&P SmallCap 600 的平均市值,也因此會加大Russell 2000指數的波動率,這兩檔ETF的費用率同樣是0.25%。Rydex也有發行追蹤S&P 純粹風格指數的ETF,例如 Rydex S&P 500 Pure Growth (PRG)以及Rydex S&P 500 Pure Value (RPV),雖然這兩個純粹風格指數之間的關聯性低,但目前還並未得到市場廣泛的採用。
(本文由晨星美國撰寫,晨星台灣編譯)
大部份股票型基金經理人會在價值型或成長型的投資策略中,選擇採取一種投資風格。價值型基金的經理人尋找相對便宜的股票,而成長型基金經理人則挑選具有吸引力的優質公司。我們將藉由本文來檢視價值與成長型股票的定義,並且以實例來進行說明這兩類投資風格的ETF。
風格的定義
雖然指數的觀念已存在一段時間了,但是追蹤價值和成長型股票的指數,直到1980年代才開始發展。不論是廣泛或主要指數的定義皆相當簡單,它們將規模落在某個門檻內的所有股票列入指數的編制中。但如果該指數是要特別訴求”風格”的話,那麼這個指數就得運用一些篩選規則,藉以區分價值及成長型股票。在概念上,價值型股票是相對於某些價值衡量結果後,目前交易價格較低的股票;而成長型股票則是多指目前具有盈收快速成長潛力的股票。價值型股票在辨別上相對較容易,一般通常會利用目前股價與該公司過去的歷史財務數據,如盈收或帳面價值等,相比較後所得到的本益比或股價/帳面價值比率來加以界定。
本益比(P/E ratio)的倒數是收益率,也可以視為利率或股票的報酬率。股票收益率與債券殖利率的概念相當接近,只不過並非所有的公司收益都會被當作股息發放給股東。一般認為,一檔股票若有低本益比或高收益率,便意味著該股票具有投資價值並有提供高報酬率的潛力,不過它也可能隱含較高的風險,就像是高殖利率的垃圾債券也通常被認為較具風險性。
另一方面,成長型股票就較難以界定。以時間點的角度來看,成長型股票可用歷史資料來加以評估,例如歷史的銷售數據或盈收成長,而期間該公司股價通常也會上揚以反映強勁的成長前景。另一個更好的方法,是前瞻性的衡量方法,例如採用分析師的盈收或成長預測數字。不過,分析師的預測普遍存在一個問題,那就是分析師認定企業未來成長性的速度會比市場來的慢,所以當公司將會明顯成長時,其股價早已上揚。由於要藉由過去的歷史數字來作預測有相當程度的困難點,因此有人也建議以公司股價的上漲動能,來作為公司成長的領先指標。因為公司成長代表企業的改變,動能就可能會是判斷公司是否正經歷改變的一個不錯的衡量指標。不過,動能一向被認為是與價值或成長截然不同的第三種投資風格。如果將最具有動能的股票都歸類為成長型股票,那麼其餘的價值型股票就會變成是動能不足的股票。然事實上,向來被視為價值型的股票也具有上漲動能,尤其是與商業週期波動有相關的股票。
另一種判斷成長或價值型股票的方式,則是用產業來加以區分。成熟的資本密集型產業通常被視為價值型產業,而科技或是消費產品及消費者服務產業,因為產業趨勢的影響力較大,它們通常被視為成長型產業。價值型公司通常會支付股利,因為該類型公司的成長機會較少,因此不需要大量的新資本投入。成長型公司的盈收報酬比資金成本來的高,所以這類公司通常會將盈收再投資於本身的業務,而不用來發放股利。
四大指數公司採用各種不同的方法來定義價值或成長型股票。羅素(Russell)使用兩個衡量指標(帳面價值/股價的比率,以及分析師的長期成長預測值),而摩根士丹利(MSCI)則採用了八個衡量指標。理想中,這些衡量方法應可切割出各個截然不同,並且之間低度相關,但會與價值或成長等因素高度相關的投資組合。在經過篩選之後,會有三分之一具有最高價值型分數的股票被放置於價值型指數中,而另外三分之一具有最高成長型分數的股票則被納入成長型指數中。而剩下三分之一的股票,同時具有價值和成長兩種特性,就會被分配在兩種指數之間,這樣一來,這些股票會有一部份比重為價值型,而有另一部份比重為成長型。因為在設計上,這些風格指數有重疊的部份,所以之間的相關性也往往較高。在過去的10年間,標準普爾(S&P)風格指數之間的相關性是最高的,而摩根士丹利則是最低的。為了解決這個問題,標準普爾公司修改了它們的衡量方法,在成長衡量要素之中增加動能因子,並推出一組新的風格指數,取名為「純粹」價值型以及成長型指數,這兩個指數並沒有重疊的部份,並且依照股票風格的分數而非股票市值來分配權重。過去10年標準普爾價值型和成長型指數之間的相關性為0.86,而它們的純粹風格型指數的相關係數僅0.70。
長期來看,價值型股票的表現優於成長型股票。除了它們的報酬率稍高外,該類型股票的波動率也較低。在過去的10年中,S&P 500 價值型指數的年化報酬率為1.6%,標準差為16.6%,而S&P 500成長型指數則下跌了2.9%,標準差為17.7%。大量的分析研究亦顯示價值型股票報酬表現較好;而另一方面,僅少數的證據支持成長型股票的投資。不過,對於價值型股票部分的界定,雖然已有清楚明確的共識,但是成長型股票的定義卻仍較模糊不清。事實上,大家往往也將價值股與熱門股來作比較,而熱門股與價值型股票相反,雖然熱門股並不一定會快速成長,但是股價絕對是相當貴的。不過,這並不意味著價值型股票的報酬表現一定會比較好,希望能夠盡量降低風險或投資期間較短的投資人應投資於主要指數產品,而不是投資風格指數產品。
晨星的觀察及建議
雖然成長型股票通常會比價值型股票來的貴,然在過去的10年內,成長型股票的本益比下降的速度卻比價值型股票來的快。這反映了過去10年來,成長型股票在科技泡沫年代的交易比率數字過於膨脹,並且近來長期成長的預測數字有下降的趨勢。
晨星的分析師認為,目前的價值型股票比成長型股票具有吸引力, iShares S&P 500 Value Index (IVE)的交易價格/公平價值(P/F)比率為0.84,而iShare S&P 500 Growth Index(IVW)為0.94。不過,這些分析師也認為S&P 500 成長型指數的成份股素質較高,因為該指數中有50%的投資部位具有寬廣的經濟護城河,而在S&P 500價值型指數中,只有34%具有寬廣經濟護城河。擁有寬廣經濟護城河的企業具備高度競爭力的經濟優勢,並能維持其高於成本的資本報酬率。因此,在成長型指數中有較多具有經濟護城河的公司一點也不讓人意外,因為這些企業持續投資於本身業務,並且能增長自身盈收的能力較高。
目前有幾檔以價值或成長型投資風格為主題的ETF。如果你所要找尋的是涵蓋所有大小市值股票的ETF,你可能會喜愛 iShares Russell 3000 Growth (IWZ)或是iShares Russell 3000 Value (IWW),這兩檔ETF包含了近乎整個股票市場,但僅收取0.25%的費用。我們通常不建議選取混合或搭配不同指數公司的投資風格基金,因為這樣指數的投資標的容易發生不必要的重疊狀況。在大型股部分,我們偏愛Vanguard Growth ETF (VUG)以及Vanguard Value ETF (VTV),這兩檔ETF的費用率為0.15%。雖然各家指數公司界定風格的方法相當類似,但是在中型股和小型股的部分,卻有較明顯的差異。S&P在指數編製的條件上較為嚴格,規定公司須具備足夠的財務能力才能被納入指數中,而未出現獲利的小型公司也往往波動過大。因此,在小型股的部分,我們較推薦iShares S&P SmallCap 600 Growth (IJT)而非 iShares Russell 2000 Growth (IWO)。除此之外,S&P SmallCap 600 Growth也含有較少的成長型股票,而有較多的價值型股票。Russell 2000成份股的平均市值也小於S&P SmallCap 600 的平均市值,也因此會加大Russell 2000指數的波動率,這兩檔ETF的費用率同樣是0.25%。Rydex也有發行追蹤S&P 純粹風格指數的ETF,例如 Rydex S&P 500 Pure Growth (PRG)以及Rydex S&P 500 Pure Value (RPV),雖然這兩個純粹風格指數之間的關聯性低,但目前還並未得到市場廣泛的採用。
(本文由晨星美國撰寫,晨星台灣編譯)
2010年8月19日
Company Distribution by Stock screener
之前在玩Google Finance股票篩選功能(如上圖)的時候,發現Google的這個功能有將這些選股的指標畫出分佈圖,這是挺有趣的功能。對了,上面的圖只是舉例,並不是建議大家以這樣的準則去選股,而且你會發現用這樣的準則去選股,選出來的公司大多數你都不認識,那要怎麼投資?
Market cap:市值,主要市值分佈於一百萬美元到三千三百億美元之間,而一億到十億美元是最多數的。但最小市值只有一千美元,最大則有兩兆多(我猜這應該是基金)。
P/E ratio:本益比,16倍是分佈的高峰,但也有不少公司本益比超過一百倍,甚至整個分佈的右側是一千多倍,而本益比最高有35601倍。看了這個分佈,也難怪過去會把15當成是本益比魔術數字。
Div yield (%):殖利率,主要分佈最右側是15.49%,最高有136%,但大多都在2-5%。
Price to book:股價淨值比,1.06-1.38是分佈的高峰,主要分佈的右側是180,最高有187萬(好恐怖的是數字)。所以1.0或1.5是股價淨值比的魔術數字,也可以由這個分佈得到間接支持。
Beta:整個分佈從-2.22到7.04,最低-170,最高153,分佈高峰為1.37。如果以1.0為分界,則可以看得出來波動比大盤高的公司多於比大盤低的公司。
Quote change (%):股價變化,這應該是當天的資料,從下跌26%到上漲57%,但整個分佈集中在正負兩成的變動。
52w high、52w low:一年內股價最高點和最低點的分佈,最高點很明顯是波克夏,而可以看得出來股價分佈並不是常態的。
200d avg price:兩百日均價:高峰在股價28.23,而大多數的股價分佈則在1-70之間,這也是一般會進行股價分割或反分割的股價上下限,而波克夏的B股分割也是讓股價落在這個範圍。
52w price change:呈現雙峰分佈,中間的谷底剛好是0%,所以表示這一年來有一群股票是下跌的,一群股票是上漲的,而下跌群的分佈高峰是下跌20-40%,上漲群的分佈高峰則是上漲10-100%。下跌最多的有98.87%,上漲最多的則有18272%,股價一年來漲了快兩百倍。
Div per share (Recent yr):近一年來的每股股利,最高有28美元,但主要分佈的右側則是5美元左右,而有超過一半的公司不到1美元。
Book value/share:每股淨值:主要分佈的範圍在-29.75到198左右,高峰在8.66。
Cash/share:每股現金比,主要分佈的右側為51.17,但最高有將近兩萬。
Return on assets (5 yr avg) (%):總資產報酬率,分佈略成雙峰,谷底為0%,主要分佈的右側為63.7%,而最高峰為10.1%,而一些選股準則認為ROA應該高於10%-12%。
Return on equity (5 yr avg) (%):股東權益報酬率,分佈呈現雙峰,谷底為0%,主要分佈的右側為329%,右側高峰的最高點為15.58%,而一些選股準則則認為ROE應該高於15%。
Return on investment (5 yr avg) (%):投資報酬率,分佈呈現雙峰,谷底為0%,主要分佈的右側為142%,右側高峰的最高點為9.89%,而一些選股準則則認為ROI應該高於10%。這三個數據都有TTM(trailing 12 months)、Recent yr和5 yr avg可選擇,我以長期投資為主,所以看的是五年平均。
Average volume:平均交易量(通常為年平均),分佈左側為3417,因此如果交易量少於這個數字,盡量不要碰比較好,很有可能會有流動性風險,想賣卻賣不掉。而一般建議交易量至少超過一百萬以上比較好,最高則有到415萬。
Gross margin (%):毛利率,主要分佈左側為3.84%,高峰為48%。
EBITDA margin (%):稅前息前折攤前獲利率,呈現雙峰分佈,谷底為0%,主要分佈的右側高峰的最高點為20.5%。
Operating margin (%):營業利潤率,呈現雙峰分佈,谷底為0%,主要分佈的右側高峰的最高點為20.1%。
Net profit margin (%):稅後淨利率,呈現雙峰分佈,谷底為0%,主要分佈的右側高峰的最高點為10.07%。
5y net income growth rate:五年淨收益成長率,呈現雙峰分佈,谷底為0%,主要分佈的右側高峰的最高點為20%,左側高峰的最高點為-10%。
5y revenue growth rate:五年銷售收入成長率,呈現雙峰分佈,谷底為0%,主要分佈的右側高峰的最高點為20%,左側高峰的最高點為-10%。
5y EPS growth rate:五年每股盈餘成長率,呈現雙峰分佈,谷底為0%,主要分佈的右側高峰的最高點為20%,左側高峰的最高點為-10%。
註:What's the difference between revenue and income?
“Net income” is the phrase commonly used to refer to a company’s “profit.” It represents how much money the company has left over, if any, after it’s paid the costs of doing business — payroll, raw materials, taxes, interest on loans, etc..
Revenue (sometimes called sales) refers to all the money a company takes in from doing what it does — whether making goods or providing services.
2010年8月2日
華裔投資家或接班巴菲特執掌伯克希爾&Li Lu's 2010 Lecture at Columbia
21年前﹐李路是天安門廣場上抗議活動中的學生領袖﹐現在則是一名對沖基金經理﹐他有望成為巴菲特(Warren Buffett)在伯克希爾哈撒韋公司(Berkshire Hathaway Inc.)的繼任者。
今年44歲的李路成為運營伯克希爾哈撒韋1000億美元中多數投資組合的主要候選人﹐這源於他與該公司86歲的副董事長芒格(Charlie Munger)的摯友關係。在採訪中﹐芒格透露李路可能成為伯克希爾哈撒韋負責投資的高管之一。芒格說﹐在我看來﹐這是預料中的事情。
相關報導:索科爾──巴菲特的接班人?
繼承巴菲特的事業是現代企業史上最惹人關注的繼任故事之一。一個月後將過80歲生日的巴菲特表示﹐目前沒有退休計劃﹐在他離開公司後﹐可能將把工作一分為二 ﹐分為首席執行長和投資職能。李路成為監管伯克希爾哈撒韋投資業務的競爭者﹐也是第一個被點名可能將接替巴菲特執掌投資部門角色的人。
這一進展說明伯克希爾哈撒韋正在推進繼任計劃的某些方面﹐此舉可能早於投資者們的預期。
已經加入美國籍的李路已為伯克希爾哈撒韋賺了大錢:他把芒格介紹給中國電池和汽車生產企業比亞迪﹐伯克希爾哈撒韋隨後就投資了。巴菲特說﹐2008年以來﹐ 伯克希爾哈撒韋持有的比亞迪股份已增加逾五倍﹐獲利約12億美元。1998年以來李路的對沖基金復合收益年率為26.4%﹐而同期內標準普爾500指數為 2.25%。
李路在華爾街的晉升非常富有戲劇性:文化大革命期間他父母被送去勞改後﹐他的童年時代是在寄養家庭中輾轉度過的。天安門事件後﹐他逃到法國﹐然後去了美國。他對沖基金里的投資者包括美國企業一些資深高管及音樂人Sting﹐後者認為李路“工作勤奮又聰明。”
李路的投資策略與巴菲特明顯不同:李路主要投資亞洲高科技企業﹐但巴菲特通常對他不瞭解的行業不投資。
巴菲特表示﹐伯克希爾哈撒韋的核心投資工作可以由兩個或兩個以上經理管理﹐他們地位一樣﹐為伯克希爾哈撒韋1000億美元的投資組合負擔不同的職責。索科爾(David Sokol)是公司旗下中美能源控股公司(MidAmerican Energy Holdings)的董事長﹐人們認為他是首席執行長的頭號競爭者。今年53歲的索科爾於1991加入中美能源控股﹐以工作不知疲倦聞名。
在採訪中﹐巴菲特拒絕直接評論繼任計劃。但他並不排除在他仍在為伯克希爾哈撒韋掌舵期間﹐引入李路這樣的投資經理。
巴菲特說﹐我喜歡在我仍在這個崗位的時候引入其他投資經理的這個想法。他說不會排除今年作出這樣的舉動﹐但他補充說﹐也沒有為很快補充投資經理設定“目標”。巴菲特說﹐他想象這是一個團隊﹐伯克希爾哈撒韋的投資高管作為一個團隊接受報酬﹐他說﹐我不希望他們競爭。
巴菲特說﹐李路在許多重要方面適合這一職位。他說﹐你希望有人能夠在新問題還沒有發生前就未雨綢繆。李路是一個逆向投資者﹐在比亞迪股票遭打壓下跌的時候﹐ 他買入了該股。另外他還是伯克希爾哈撒韋的忠實粉絲﹐這或許也可以幫助他的事業。巴菲特說﹐除非他們對伯克希爾哈撒韋有特殊的感情﹐否則我們不會僱傭他們。
但聘用李路可能有風險﹐他對比亞迪的大量押注是他唯一一次大規模投資的全勝記錄﹐如果沒有比亞迪的獲利﹐他作為對沖基金經理的表現則乏善可陳。
如果讓他管理伯克希爾哈撒韋的一個大規模投資組合﹐他是否能獲得這樣的利潤﹐這仍是個未知數。
更重要的是﹐他的戰略是進行大筆投資﹐在市場下滑時也毫不動搖﹐這種戰略可能會在漫長的熊市中產生事與願違的效果。儘管2009年獲得了200%的回報﹐截至今年6月底前﹐他管理的投資組合已經縮水13%﹐是同期標準普爾500指數6.6%跌幅的近兩倍。
李路拒絕討論在伯克希爾哈撒韋的可能任職﹐只是說能成為伯克希爾哈撒韋內部圈子的一份子﹐他感到很幸運。他說﹐這是你做夢也想像不到的。
李路出生於1966年文革開始的那一年。他說﹐他九個月大時﹐他當工程師的父親被送到了一個煤礦接受“再教育”。他的母親被送到了一個勞改所。李路的父母向很多家付錢﹐希望他們照顧他。有好幾年﹐他都在好幾個家庭之間輾轉﹐直到到了家鄉唐山一個文盲礦工的家裡。他和這個礦工建立了深厚的感情。李路說﹐小小年紀就與家人分離﹐這教會了他生存的技能。
十歲後﹐他與父母和兩個兄弟重新團聚。當時他的家鄉唐山發生了一場大地震﹐造成約24.2萬人遇難﹐其中包括照顧他的礦工一家。他說﹐他們家在地震中倖免﹐不過他認識的大部分人都死了。
李路說﹐當時他沒有方向﹐在街上打架鬥毆。他說﹐他的祖母激勵他開始讀書學習。他的祖母是她們市里第一批女大學生之一。李路後來上了南京大學﹐專業是物理。
1989年4月﹐他到北京天安門廣場遇到了在那裡集會悼念胡耀邦的學生。胡耀邦被視為是一個民主與改革的支持者。
學生們抗議腐敗等問題﹐李路參與了學生的組織工作﹐並參加了絕食。
他和其他學生後來逃往法國。1989年晚些時候﹐他到了美國﹐在哥倫比亞大學發表演講。那裡的人權活動人士像迎接英雄一樣地迎接了他。他不太會說英語﹐不過卻收到了一筆寫書的預付款﹐書的內容是關於他自己經歷的。
在哥倫比亞大學獎學金的幫助下﹐李路迅速學會了英語。據哥倫比亞大學說﹐他成了該校第一批同時獲得三個學位的學生之一:經濟學、法學和商業碩士學位。
在李路的學生貸款不斷增加之際﹐1993年他聽了巴菲特在哥倫比亞大學的一次講座。當時﹐90年代的牛市正如火如荼﹐對沖基金在上升階段。李路說﹐在中國﹐他不相信金融市場﹐不過聽過巴菲特的講座之後﹐幫助他克服了對股市投資的質疑。
他開始用寫書的預付款投資股市。1996年畢業前﹐他已經有了相當規模的儲蓄﹐他說他覺得自己可以退休了。然而﹐他接受了證券公司帝傑(Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette)的一份工作﹐之後離職創建了自己的對沖基金。1997年﹐他創建了對沖基金Himalaya Partners。之後﹐他建立了一只風險投資基金﹐以便投資美國的科技公司。
當時正值華爾街令人迷醉的時候。互聯網熱剛剛開始。投資者們吵著找熱門股。
通過他的人權人士的關係﹐李路迅速吸引了包括伯恩斯坦(Bob Bernstein)和音樂家斯汀(Sting)在內的富有客戶。伯恩斯坦是蘭登書屋(Random House)前董事長﹐也是“人權觀察”前主席。李路說﹐其他投資者還包括金融家科爾博格(Jerome Kohlberg)﹐新聞集團(News Corp.)董事、Allen & Co.高管舒曼(Stanley Shuman)﹐以及對沖基金經理納什(Jack Nash)。
新聞集團擁有道瓊斯公司(Dow Jones & Co.)和《華爾街日報》。道瓊斯公司為道瓊斯通訊社的出版商。
不過﹐1998年李路擔任對沖基金經理的第一年就損失慘重。他的以投資亞洲股市為主的基金受到了亞洲債務危機的嚴重打擊﹐損失了19%。
他說﹐我感覺很糟﹐因為人們信任我﹐他們知道的只是我是一個學生活動分子﹐他們看到的只是損失。
隨著亞洲危機迅速消退﹐他的財富反彈。1998年伊始﹐一場新的大牛市也隨之到來。當時對沖基金行業急速發展﹐到1999年末﹐李路的基金已經補回了損失。
2002年﹐對沖基金巨頭朱利安•羅伯森(Julian Robertson)斥資投資李路的基金﹐條件是基金在做多的同時也要做空。
這樣的條件並不合適。李路說他痛恨做空股票﹐抱怨說他不得不一直進行交易﹐調整自己的投資組合。(該基金剩餘的部分目前正在清理。)羅伯森拒絕就這一商業關係發表評論。
簡 •奧爾森(Jane Olson)是李路在人權方面的一位聯絡人﹐她的丈夫羅納德•奧爾森(Ronald Olson)是伯克希爾的董事﹐還曾是芒格幫助創建的一家洛杉磯法律事務所的早期合伙人。李路會去奧爾森夫婦位於加州聖巴巴拉的週末度假房﹐2003年的感恩節﹐他遇到了家在附近的芒格。
芒格說﹐李路馬上就給他留下了印象。他說﹐兩人都對金融公司報告的收益抱有懷疑﹐也都不喜歡聽那些廢話。
芒格給了李路一部分家庭儲蓄用於投資﹐創立了一個押注嚴重受挫股票的“價值”基金。
李路說﹐兩週後他與芒格再度會面﹐以確保後者的聽證權。2004年初﹐李路創立了一個基金﹐自己投資400萬美元﹐又從其他投資者那裡籌集5,000萬美元。芒格的家族投資5,000萬﹐後來又投資3,800萬。李路與芒格達成的協議中有基金將不再向新投資者開放的內容。
李路獲得成功始於2002年首次投資比亞迪﹐當時比亞迪只是一家羽翼未豐的中國電池公司。比亞迪創始人出身貧寒﹐1995年用借來的30萬美元開創了這家公司。
比亞迪在香港證交所進行首次公開募股(IPO)後不久﹐李路就投資了這家公司。(比亞迪在美國“粉單”(Pink Sheets)市場交易﹐最近報每股6.90美元。)
李路創立自己的基金後﹐再次買進比亞迪股票﹐最終將與芒格共同經營的1.5億美元基金中很大一部分都投向了比亞迪﹐後者當時迅速發展﹐已經收購了一家破產的中國汽車製造商。芒格說﹐李路一開始只買了一點兒﹐後來比亞迪股票下跌時又買入更多﹐這是他的特點。
2008年﹐芒格還說服索科爾為伯克希爾調查比亞迪。索科爾去了中國﹐回到美國後﹐他與芒格一同勸說巴菲特加大對比亞迪的投資。9月﹐伯克希爾向比亞迪投資2.3億美元﹐收購了該公司10%的股份。
比亞迪的業務一直火爆。現在它已佔了全球用於手機的鋰電池市場近三分之一的份額。比亞迪更宏大的計劃包括電動汽車和混合動力車方面的業務。
作為中國最大的汽車廠商之一﹐比亞迪面臨的考驗在於能否實現其開發市場上能效最高的鋰電池的計劃﹐這種電池未來可能成為更強勁的動力來源。更有前景的是﹐鋰電池有可能用於存儲太陽能和風能等其他能源產生的電力。
芒格說﹐大型鋰電池將改變整個行業的狀況。
比亞迪是李路重點押注的對象。他是該公司的非正式顧問﹐並擁有約2.5%的股權。
李路的基金向比亞迪投資的4,000萬美元現在價值約4億美元。伯克希爾2008年投資的2.3億美元現在價值約15億美元。巴菲特、芒格、索科爾和李路﹐還有微軟創始人兼伯克希爾董事比爾•蓋茨(Bill Gates)計劃今年9月訪問中國並參觀比亞迪。
現在李路可以在有限制的條件下在中國旅行。但中國政府對他有何看法還不清楚。
李路拒絕透露基金的其他資產。雖然今年出現虧損﹐但這個規模6億美元的基金自2004年底創立以來已經增長了338%﹐年化回報率約30%﹐而標普500指數年化回報率不足1%。
李路對投資者說﹐他從世界杯觀賽經歷中汲取了一項教訓﹐他將自己的投資風格比作足球。他說﹐你有可能踢得非常賣力﹐但就是進不了球﹐但偶然之間──非常偶然──你得到一兩個好機會﹐從而踢進決定性的進球。
Susan Pulliam
Li Lu’s 2010 Lecture at Columbia
Bruce Greenwald: Warren Buffett says that when he retires, there are three people he would like to manage his money. First is Seth Klarman of the Baupost Group, who you will hear from later in the course. Next is Greg Alexander of the Sequoia Fund. Third is Li Lu. He happens to manage all of Charlie Munger’s money. I have a small investment with him and in four years it is up 400%.
[Applause]
Li Lu: Columbia is where my whole life in America started. I could barely speak the language. In Columbia it was where I had a new life. It was really in the Value Investing class where I got my career start. I was really worried about my student loan debt at the time and a friend told me about this class and said I need to see a lecture from Warren Buffett.
What I heard that night changed my life. He said three things:
1. A stock is not a piece of paper, it is a piece of ownership in a company.
2. You need a margin of safety so if you are wrong you don’t lose much.
3. In the market, most people are in it for the short term. It allows you a framework for dealing with the day to day volatility.
Those were three powerful concepts. I had never viewed the stock market like that. I viewed it negatively as a place made up of manipulators who were lining their own pockets. I embarked on an intensive two year study learning everything about Buffett.
Two years after that I bought my first stock. After I graduated I worked at an investment bank for a year and realized it was a mistake. I tried to start a fund but I didn’t have a track record. The first year I managed money I lost 19%.
Being a value investor means you look at the downside before looking at the upside. Before becoming an investor you need to look at how you can fail at this game. There are all sorts of ways you can fail. You need to examine who you are and see if you could be good at it. If you could ever find something you can do well that you really like — that will be your best investment. You will do better than competitors. If you can do it with intrinsic passion, that really over time will add enormous value to you.
Back to the game of investing. This concept of margin of safety is an essential concept to be a good investor. The future is unpredictable, you will always be dealt surprises, some positive most negative. You need to build in a level of safety so that whatever happens, you will not get crushed. If you can really successfully know what you are getting into, you can pretty much navigate. Most people are troubled by what they don’t know. The world is divided by those who know and those who don’t know. If you really know — you will not pull triggers like Wall St. traders. If you are truly intellectually honest, you would not do anything.
This class teaches you to know what you are getting into, especially accepting what things you don’t know. The game of investment is really continuous learning. Everything affects an investment, it constantly changes. You are not investing in the past but the accumulative cash flow of the future. You have to want to find a certain set up where you can know something that most people don’t know. There are plenty of things I don’t know but they don’t factor into the purchase because I am using a huge margin of safety. Buying a dollar at 50 cents. So if things turn against you, you will be okay. That is not easy. This business is brutally competitive. It is so impossible to know everything and know exactly what is going to happen to a business from now till the end that you really have to accept that what you don’t know.
Finding an edge really only comes from a right frame of mind and years of continuous study. But when you find those insights along the road of study, you need to have the guts and courage to back up the truck and ignore the opinions of everyone else. To be a better investor, you have to stand on your own. You just can’t copy other people’s insights. Sooner or later, the position turns against you. If you don’t have any insights into the business, when it goes from $100 to $50 you aren’t going to know if it will back to $100 or $200.
So this is really difficult, but on the other hand, the rewards are huge. Warren says that if you only come up with 10 good investments in your 40 year career, you will be extraordinarily rich. That’s really what it is. This shows how different value investing is than any other subject.
So how do you really understand and gain that great insight? Pick one business. Any business. And truly understand it. I tell my interns to work through this exercise – imagine a distant relative passes away and you find out that you have inherited 100% of a business they owned. What are you going to do about it? That is the mentality to take when looking at any business. I strongly encourage you to start and understand 1 business, inside out. That is better than any training possible. It does not have to be a great business, it could be any business. You need to be able to get a feel for how you would do as a 100% owner. If you can do that, you will have a tremendous leg up against the competition. Most people don’t take that first concept correctly and it is quite sad. People view it as a piece of paper and just trade because it is easy to trade. But if it was a business you inherited, you would not be trading. You would really seek out knowledge on how it should be run, how it works. If you start with that, you will eventually know how much that business is worth.
When I started in the business in 1997, it was in the middle of the Asian Financial Crisis. A few years later there was the Internet bubble. A couple years ago was the Great Crash of 2007 – 2008. They are billed as once in a century disasters but happen every few years. Every time it goes against you, your net worth or value of your investments might go down 50%. This is really where that insight and temperament comes in. In a sense, you have to have a certain confidence in your own judgement and not be swayed by other people’s views. It is not easy. But that is life. It is just a given. It happens to everyone. Berkshire had at least three times when the stock went down 50%. It happened to Carnegie too. It happened to Rockefeller. It happens to everyone. If you really made a mistake, it would not stop at 50% but go to 0.
This happens to even mighty companies. Look at the top 50 companies in America every 10 years. By the time 20-40 years go by, 2/3rds of them will be gone. By the time it goes to 100 years, there might be only a couple left. It’s just the way it is. Look at what happened to the once mighty General Motors. So thats why I’m saying is, investing is a continuous learning process because your investments are constantly changing
So for those of you that have curiosity and the temperament, this game couldn’t be better. Capitalism rewards people who are talented at capital allocator. So if you have the aptitude and temperament, it is the great game. If you don’t have that then I urge you not to go and become a nuisance. That is really what Wall Street did, they don’t really create anything they just move money around. Letting the financial industry get too big is bad for the economy, it is just as bad as getting addicted to casinos, drugs, and alcohol. None of them are really useful, they just transfer wealth. That is what I think happened on Wall Street over the last several decades. So avoid being harmful.
With that I am open to questions.
Q: Mohnish Pabrai recently spoke about his reluctance about investing in China due to the multiple accounting books / the possibility of fraud. How do you deal with this given your own investments in China?
Li Lu: Well, you know I think he is right. Every thing has an exception though. Just because a next door neighbor is a fraud doesn’t mean you are. That is one question to ask — whether you can trust the accounting and people running the business. That can have a huge impact on the business. I suggest you spend a lot of time looking at these factors, especially if you are investing for the long haul.
Q: Why did you decide to go into venture capital? How is that different than your other investing?
Li Lu: I always had this bent that I want to build a real business. I started a venture and it was really a lot of fun. Overall, it is a tougher game than simply investing in securities because you have to evolve to the day to day changes in operations and it is just not as easy to build great businesses. Every generation has a handful of great businesses that come from no where and come to dominate their fields. It is much more rewarding as an investor to pick those. Also, you are more likely to find managers much more capable than yourself. Overall, I learned a lot. I learned a lot in how businesses succeed and how businesses fail. It really was a lot of fun. I probably carried it too far — I eventually ran one of the businesses and it was of course a mistake.
Q: I read that when you look at an industry, you look at the most miserable failures of that industry to see whether you will invest in it. Can you talk a bit about that?
Li Lu: It goes back to understanding the business. Once you have that understanding you can extend it to understanding an industry. A certain industry might have characteristics that make it different than others. In certain industries you might have better prospects than others. Find the best of the players in the industry and the worst players. And see how they perform over time. And if the worst players perform reasonably well relative to the great players — that tells you something about the characteristics about the industry. That is not always the case but it is often the case. Certain industries are better than others.
So if you can understand a business inside out you can then eventually extend that to understanding an industry. If you can get that insight, it is enormously beneficial. If you can then concentrate that on a business with superior economics in an industry with superior economics with good management and you get them at the right price — the chances are that you can stay for a very long time.
Q: Did you have any specific example?
Li Lu: I have studied many over the years. As I have said, don’t copy other people’s insights because it doesn’t work. Automobiles are amazing. If you look at the early days it started with several players and concentrated with just a few players that became enormously profitable. Then they became miserable. You then see how the life cycle turns with new automakers in China and India. Everything has a reason. If you want a good idea — look at General Motors from the early days, look every 5 years and see how the performance metrics change. The Graham and Dodd Center should collect all the data and perform some kind of commentary on it.
Bruce Greenwald: Do you want me to give you the answer to that? In the 1960s, their return on capital was 46%. In the 1970s their return on capital was 28%. In the 1980s it was 9% in the 1990s it was 6%. You want to guess how negative it is now?
Li Lu: So that is really fascinating. If you have that data, the amount of insight that would yield would be astonishing. So instead of just accepting the conventional wisdom that the auto business is bad — that is just not true. Or if you say well those guys just unbelievable money machines — that is not true either. So if you can really examine those statistics and understand it that will give you an advantage for analyzing new situations like in China and India. That is really what turns me on. Understanding this gives you a tremendous leg up.
Q: I wanted to ask you about BYD. I heard that you thought it was important for them to introduce a model to the US and wanted to know why you thought that.
Li Lu: That might be a better question to ask the BYD chairman than myself. Well, If you are just talking about electric vehicles, you know the key — the heart and soul of the electric vehicle age the heart is the battery. There is the battery, electric motor, and the electric control control panel. The electric motor has been there for 100 years, control system is software that can be improved over time.
The battery is really where you get the biggest appreciation and is what determines the value of the electric vehicle. 100 years before the Model-T was introduced, the competition between electric vehicles and gasoline was not nearly as optimistic. Up and till then, 1/3rd of cars being produced were electric. It wasn’t until Rockefeller got oil extracted easily enough that it worked. Henry Ford was able to make the internal combustion work even though it wasted 85% of the energy. He was able to build the engine and produce automobiles that were cheap enough for people to buy and it took off. That is where you find the real winners.
Now, years later, we know that the way that oil is burned contributes to global warming. If it continues, the planet might still be here but all the human beings might not. Human beings have only been on the planet for a tiny bit of the earth’s history. So there are all sorts of good reasons for electric cars. Battery development has advanced so much that it is now comparable to the price and performance of traditional cars. So now with the help of companies like BYD, the balance is about to tilt towards where performance and price are getting to the level that makes them a desirable alternative. It will be desirable everywhere. Eventually, if you have a car that does all that, it will be sold everywhere.
Q: What about BYD versus others in the industry?
Li Lu: The market will determine that.
Q: Yeah – but why BYD versus others?
Li Lu: Well because we also studied all those other guys. We will see when the winner emerges whether we are right or wrong.
Q: Right – but what did you look at to reach that view?
Li Lu: There are a lot of people who have worked over 100 years making great cars. The technology for building a traditional car has been refined enough to where it can be learned in a short period. The place we are still seeing a curve of continuous rapid improvement is with the batteries for cars. Whoever is leading the charge will have a major advantage. There is really only one company that is a leader in battery manufacturing and automobile manufacturing. There is only one company. To put this together you need a Ford to put that together. So far those two elements need to be put together. It is not an easy process.
Q: So you went to BYD in 2005 and then you brought Berkshire as well. I saw that you sold a small amount of your BYD position at the end of last year. Was it just rebalancing? Can I just wanted to get your thoughts on that.
Li Lu: Actually I started my BYD position in 2002. I sold a small amount of shares because an investor of mine had an emergency redemption.
Q: We read your profile online. I had a question – do you have any problems when trying to invest in China?
Li Lu: Yeah I do have some difficulty. I did not really see a factory plant at BYD until the end of 2008. I really did not have a better understanding till then. That really causes you to question what it is before you make an investment. With investing, you have to work with imperfect information because you are buying a piece of the future. I did not really get a chance to get more information because the problem in Asia till much later but it did not stop me from making my investment decision. So there is a point, where if you have enough margin of safety– that is why I kept coming back to the elementary concept of margin of safety– you can allow much more uncertainty and unknowns. So the answer of the question is does that stop you from making the investment? No.
Q: So I did some research on lithium ion batteries, and I saw that BYD has a manufacturing advantage with consumer batteries. But I saw that automobile batteries are much more complex. I did not think that the idea of a good consumer battery manufacturer + an automobile maker made much sense. So when Buffett looked at the stock maybe it was a better deal but today it is this dream of vehicles that is really priced in. It does not feel like a good value investor stock. So why would you own it today?
Li Lu: Well that is interesting. One of the most fascinating things about being an investor is that surprises are part of the game. When you get into situations like BYD, you see lots of good surprises. Chuanfu and his team have this fabulous culture, everything people thought they knew turned out to be a few years late. He got into battery manufacturing in that particular way because he really had no other option. He had no money, he only had $300,000 in venture capital funding before IPO and that was it. He raised money in an IPO and Buffett gave him $200M, now they have 160,000 employees. $6-7B in revenues, $500M in net profit. It is amazing. So he has this ability to adapt in a competitive environment. He has demonstrated that ability again again and again. The way he does automation is far cheaper than anyone else and more reliable. He continues to surprise me with his ingenuity, to figure out ways to do something better than everyone else. What he is currently doing is very different than what everyone else has done. At the end of the day, you might look at what he has done.
So how do you look at it as an investor with imperfect information? Well I suggest you look at what he has accomplished. 8 years ago I had no idea they would go into the automobile or laptop or cellphone battery business. So that demonstrates how he is. This investment is not easy to understand because it is changing so fast, at such a large scale. An almost unheard of speed. Their manufacturing capabilities will double soon. This year they will hire 10,000 college graduates, 8 or 9 thousand engineers. The scale is almost unparalleled. So this is why the study of history, of all the great corporations will give you a good insight in seeing what will happen with BYD. I suggested that we start with GM and analyze its performance every 5 years for 100 years to understand at least one aspect of BYD’s business.
Q: One investor came in and said talking to management is a waste of time. They will say what you want them to say. Obviously it sounds like you don’t agree with that. What do you think? Will you pay a premium for a business with a moat?
Li Lu: There is no general rule. The key in investing is to know what you know and know what you don’t know. You can know about management teams without meeting with them. Every situation is slightly different. So I come back to the point that if you know enough on other things that there is enough margin of safety. Even if you meet with management, you may not learn something. Obviously, actions speak louder. You want to see what they have done. Everything being equal, the more you know about management, the more honest and upfront they are, the more motive they have, the better the situation is and the deeper the discount. You have to analyze it all. The key to analyzing it is you have to ask: do I really know what I think I know, do I really know what I don’t know? If you can’t answer that question, chances are you are gambling.
Q: What kind of preparation do you do before meeting a management team?
Li Lu: I don’t really have a set method. Because I usually am just curious about the business and don’t know a lot. So you are prepared and not prepared. If you are really curious, you want to learn more and study it more. When working at a hedge fund or mutual fund, you are expected to learn a business in one week. You can’t truly understand everything about a business in one week. It took me 10 years and I am still learning new things about BYD. It is a continuous learning process. You could spend a lifetime studying a business or industry, but in a few seconds I can tell you whether or not I like it. You want to build knowledge by continually learning. There is not set preparation.
Q: Recently, Jim Chanos gave us his thesis on the China Syndrome with there possibly being a bubble.
Li Lu: Well, it is too big of a question for me. I don’t know
Q: 20 years ago you said you challenged conventional wisdom in China. Out of curiosity, in terms of value investing what do you challenge in the conventional wisdom?
Li Lu: Well, the fundamental philosophy of value investing is very sound. Its basically the three things:
1. A stock is not a piece of paper, it is a piece of ownership in a company.
2. You need a margin of safety so if you are wrong you don’t lose much.
3. In the market, most people are in it for the short term. It allows you a framework for dealing with the day to day volatility.
That is really an intelligent approach. So therefor any intelligent investing is really value investing. There is a certain level of intellectual honesty. If you have all that insight going into analyzing businesses I don’t have any arguments with it.
Q: What is your point of view on long / short positions in value investing?
Li Lu: The most profitable kind of investing is long term investing. You want to allow the time that it might take because you don’t know when the market will catch on. If you can find a business with good management with good industry fundamentals blowing it forward, you have a good opportunity and you can save money on taxes.
A short cannot be a fundamentally long term position. In the long game, the upside is unlimited. Your downside is 100%. In shorting it is opposite. Shorting is also essentially borrowing, so you need money and time on your side. If time is not on your side, you can be right but lose all your money. The best kind of short usually has some kind of fraud. In those situations, management is determined to keep the fraud. Look at Bernie Madoff, 20 years time. You cannot afford to borrow money for 20 years. So shorting is a short term game. When those positions go against you, there is huge leverage that can utterly crush you.
In theory, long / short is okay, but if you are trading all the time you need to be in tune with all the things moving the market. None of them might be fundamental to the actual business. So you spend all your time chasing noise than studying a long term situation. If you cannot concentrate on things in the long term, and spend all your time thinking about the short term, you will not be able to develop the kinds of insights necessary to identify great investments.
From time to time, you will lose some money on paper. But it is just part of the game. This is why I closed long / short. You know I went through three bubbles. The Asian Financial Crisis, the Internet Bubble, and this most recent financial crisis. The biggest mistake I made is not being able to pick up undervalued companies where I had a unique insight but was tied up with this whole long / short thing. The money I left on the table is still adding up. I am still paying for those mistakes.
Q: In a bull market environment, how do you re-evaluate your thesis?
Li Lu: I don’t ever want to profit from a bubble. Soros does that, that is just not my game. I don’t profess any ability to understand how long a crowd will buy into a bubble. I invest in things that appear to be compelling values that continues. So that is why this game is a continuous learning process – because everything affecting the investment is constantly changing. Including the price. Including the prospects and elements of business success. You really do want to never stop learning. This game looks to be easy but it is not easy.
Q: Given your focus on international investments, how do you think about diversifying your investments regionally?
Li Lu: First of all, I did not really specialize in international investments. I started off doing most of my investments in the US and Canada. In recent years, I just find better bargains outside of it. One of the great things about being an investor is you can look anywhere and find great pockets of opportunities. You cannot do that as a venture capitalist as I experienced myself. So you can look anywhere for opportunities. I do not take a regional approach to diversification. I have views towards certain countries and currencies, but it is not the driving force for a potential investment. If you have your fundamental things right, if you happen to have macro economic factors behind you, you can run a great wave.
Q: How is your investment style different today than when you started the fund?
Li Lu: A lot of things have changed. One bonus about this profession is you get better over time. Most professions, as you get older, you get out of the game. Take the example of competitive sports. If you are a figure skater or gymnast, after your teenage years you are out of the game. With investing, if you are doing it the right way, you get better over time. Your knowledge accumulates exponentially. When I look back at everything I have done, I would have done it all slightly differently, but that is because I am better at it today. So if you approach it in a fundamentally sound way, as you mature, you become better and better. That process and progression is like compounding money. In fact, you can compound knowledge faster than money. If you truly love this game, I would suggest that you don’t take short cuts. It might take longer but it is more rewarding.
Q: What is the difference between being a top political criminal in China versus a hedge fund manager today (referring to the ire directed at Wall Street)?
Li Lu: I don’t consider myself a criminal. I don’t think China considers me a criminal. What I think we are doing today with our investment in BYD in China is really helping China march towards a modern era of prosperity. BYD is providing a solution to both China and the US, to migrate from the past to a way that gets us out of the unsustainable carbon age that we live in. Global warming is a vital concern to every human being, so China is providing a great contribution to everybody with BYD. America has had a great history of invention and here is a great company in China that is about to make a major contribution to human civilization with cheap electric vehicles and solar power.
Ultimately we will have to get our energy from the sun. Most of the energy, even fossil fuels (plants that die and then go into the ground), all originally come from the sun. So if you can figure out a way to take energy from the sun and power vehicles, while using batteries to store it, inexpensively — will really make renewable energy power everything. The combination of those things holds the key to the future of industrial civilization that we are about to embark on. We didn’t set out with BYD with this in mind, it just happened that way. With great companies, it only looks logical in retrospect. Think about how Bill Gates started Microsoft. I don’t think he knew up front that he would take the entire market — at that time it did not exist. It is the same way with our investment in BYD. Ultimately, I think finding an inexpensive way to store energy that we harness from the sun will be a huge contribution for both China and the US, but more broadly our entire civilization.
今年44歲的李路成為運營伯克希爾哈撒韋1000億美元中多數投資組合的主要候選人﹐這源於他與該公司86歲的副董事長芒格(Charlie Munger)的摯友關係。在採訪中﹐芒格透露李路可能成為伯克希爾哈撒韋負責投資的高管之一。芒格說﹐在我看來﹐這是預料中的事情。
相關報導:索科爾──巴菲特的接班人?
繼承巴菲特的事業是現代企業史上最惹人關注的繼任故事之一。一個月後將過80歲生日的巴菲特表示﹐目前沒有退休計劃﹐在他離開公司後﹐可能將把工作一分為二 ﹐分為首席執行長和投資職能。李路成為監管伯克希爾哈撒韋投資業務的競爭者﹐也是第一個被點名可能將接替巴菲特執掌投資部門角色的人。
這一進展說明伯克希爾哈撒韋正在推進繼任計劃的某些方面﹐此舉可能早於投資者們的預期。
由左至右﹕中美能源控股董事長索科爾﹐巴菲特﹐比亞迪的王傳福和李路
已經加入美國籍的李路已為伯克希爾哈撒韋賺了大錢:他把芒格介紹給中國電池和汽車生產企業比亞迪﹐伯克希爾哈撒韋隨後就投資了。巴菲特說﹐2008年以來﹐ 伯克希爾哈撒韋持有的比亞迪股份已增加逾五倍﹐獲利約12億美元。1998年以來李路的對沖基金復合收益年率為26.4%﹐而同期內標準普爾500指數為 2.25%。
李路在華爾街的晉升非常富有戲劇性:文化大革命期間他父母被送去勞改後﹐他的童年時代是在寄養家庭中輾轉度過的。天安門事件後﹐他逃到法國﹐然後去了美國。他對沖基金里的投資者包括美國企業一些資深高管及音樂人Sting﹐後者認為李路“工作勤奮又聰明。”
李路的投資策略與巴菲特明顯不同:李路主要投資亞洲高科技企業﹐但巴菲特通常對他不瞭解的行業不投資。
巴菲特表示﹐伯克希爾哈撒韋的核心投資工作可以由兩個或兩個以上經理管理﹐他們地位一樣﹐為伯克希爾哈撒韋1000億美元的投資組合負擔不同的職責。索科爾(David Sokol)是公司旗下中美能源控股公司(MidAmerican Energy Holdings)的董事長﹐人們認為他是首席執行長的頭號競爭者。今年53歲的索科爾於1991加入中美能源控股﹐以工作不知疲倦聞名。
在採訪中﹐巴菲特拒絕直接評論繼任計劃。但他並不排除在他仍在為伯克希爾哈撒韋掌舵期間﹐引入李路這樣的投資經理。
巴菲特說﹐我喜歡在我仍在這個崗位的時候引入其他投資經理的這個想法。他說不會排除今年作出這樣的舉動﹐但他補充說﹐也沒有為很快補充投資經理設定“目標”。巴菲特說﹐他想象這是一個團隊﹐伯克希爾哈撒韋的投資高管作為一個團隊接受報酬﹐他說﹐我不希望他們競爭。
巴菲特說﹐李路在許多重要方面適合這一職位。他說﹐你希望有人能夠在新問題還沒有發生前就未雨綢繆。李路是一個逆向投資者﹐在比亞迪股票遭打壓下跌的時候﹐ 他買入了該股。另外他還是伯克希爾哈撒韋的忠實粉絲﹐這或許也可以幫助他的事業。巴菲特說﹐除非他們對伯克希爾哈撒韋有特殊的感情﹐否則我們不會僱傭他們。
但聘用李路可能有風險﹐他對比亞迪的大量押注是他唯一一次大規模投資的全勝記錄﹐如果沒有比亞迪的獲利﹐他作為對沖基金經理的表現則乏善可陳。
如果讓他管理伯克希爾哈撒韋的一個大規模投資組合﹐他是否能獲得這樣的利潤﹐這仍是個未知數。
更重要的是﹐他的戰略是進行大筆投資﹐在市場下滑時也毫不動搖﹐這種戰略可能會在漫長的熊市中產生事與願違的效果。儘管2009年獲得了200%的回報﹐截至今年6月底前﹐他管理的投資組合已經縮水13%﹐是同期標準普爾500指數6.6%跌幅的近兩倍。
李路拒絕討論在伯克希爾哈撒韋的可能任職﹐只是說能成為伯克希爾哈撒韋內部圈子的一份子﹐他感到很幸運。他說﹐這是你做夢也想像不到的。
李路出生於1966年文革開始的那一年。他說﹐他九個月大時﹐他當工程師的父親被送到了一個煤礦接受“再教育”。他的母親被送到了一個勞改所。李路的父母向很多家付錢﹐希望他們照顧他。有好幾年﹐他都在好幾個家庭之間輾轉﹐直到到了家鄉唐山一個文盲礦工的家裡。他和這個礦工建立了深厚的感情。李路說﹐小小年紀就與家人分離﹐這教會了他生存的技能。
十歲後﹐他與父母和兩個兄弟重新團聚。當時他的家鄉唐山發生了一場大地震﹐造成約24.2萬人遇難﹐其中包括照顧他的礦工一家。他說﹐他們家在地震中倖免﹐不過他認識的大部分人都死了。
李路說﹐當時他沒有方向﹐在街上打架鬥毆。他說﹐他的祖母激勵他開始讀書學習。他的祖母是她們市里第一批女大學生之一。李路後來上了南京大學﹐專業是物理。
1989年4月﹐他到北京天安門廣場遇到了在那裡集會悼念胡耀邦的學生。胡耀邦被視為是一個民主與改革的支持者。
學生們抗議腐敗等問題﹐李路參與了學生的組織工作﹐並參加了絕食。
他和其他學生後來逃往法國。1989年晚些時候﹐他到了美國﹐在哥倫比亞大學發表演講。那裡的人權活動人士像迎接英雄一樣地迎接了他。他不太會說英語﹐不過卻收到了一筆寫書的預付款﹐書的內容是關於他自己經歷的。
在哥倫比亞大學獎學金的幫助下﹐李路迅速學會了英語。據哥倫比亞大學說﹐他成了該校第一批同時獲得三個學位的學生之一:經濟學、法學和商業碩士學位。
在李路的學生貸款不斷增加之際﹐1993年他聽了巴菲特在哥倫比亞大學的一次講座。當時﹐90年代的牛市正如火如荼﹐對沖基金在上升階段。李路說﹐在中國﹐他不相信金融市場﹐不過聽過巴菲特的講座之後﹐幫助他克服了對股市投資的質疑。
他開始用寫書的預付款投資股市。1996年畢業前﹐他已經有了相當規模的儲蓄﹐他說他覺得自己可以退休了。然而﹐他接受了證券公司帝傑(Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette)的一份工作﹐之後離職創建了自己的對沖基金。1997年﹐他創建了對沖基金Himalaya Partners。之後﹐他建立了一只風險投資基金﹐以便投資美國的科技公司。
當時正值華爾街令人迷醉的時候。互聯網熱剛剛開始。投資者們吵著找熱門股。
通過他的人權人士的關係﹐李路迅速吸引了包括伯恩斯坦(Bob Bernstein)和音樂家斯汀(Sting)在內的富有客戶。伯恩斯坦是蘭登書屋(Random House)前董事長﹐也是“人權觀察”前主席。李路說﹐其他投資者還包括金融家科爾博格(Jerome Kohlberg)﹐新聞集團(News Corp.)董事、Allen & Co.高管舒曼(Stanley Shuman)﹐以及對沖基金經理納什(Jack Nash)。
新聞集團擁有道瓊斯公司(Dow Jones & Co.)和《華爾街日報》。道瓊斯公司為道瓊斯通訊社的出版商。
不過﹐1998年李路擔任對沖基金經理的第一年就損失慘重。他的以投資亞洲股市為主的基金受到了亞洲債務危機的嚴重打擊﹐損失了19%。
他說﹐我感覺很糟﹐因為人們信任我﹐他們知道的只是我是一個學生活動分子﹐他們看到的只是損失。
隨著亞洲危機迅速消退﹐他的財富反彈。1998年伊始﹐一場新的大牛市也隨之到來。當時對沖基金行業急速發展﹐到1999年末﹐李路的基金已經補回了損失。
2002年﹐對沖基金巨頭朱利安•羅伯森(Julian Robertson)斥資投資李路的基金﹐條件是基金在做多的同時也要做空。
這樣的條件並不合適。李路說他痛恨做空股票﹐抱怨說他不得不一直進行交易﹐調整自己的投資組合。(該基金剩餘的部分目前正在清理。)羅伯森拒絕就這一商業關係發表評論。
簡 •奧爾森(Jane Olson)是李路在人權方面的一位聯絡人﹐她的丈夫羅納德•奧爾森(Ronald Olson)是伯克希爾的董事﹐還曾是芒格幫助創建的一家洛杉磯法律事務所的早期合伙人。李路會去奧爾森夫婦位於加州聖巴巴拉的週末度假房﹐2003年的感恩節﹐他遇到了家在附近的芒格。
芒格說﹐李路馬上就給他留下了印象。他說﹐兩人都對金融公司報告的收益抱有懷疑﹐也都不喜歡聽那些廢話。
芒格給了李路一部分家庭儲蓄用於投資﹐創立了一個押注嚴重受挫股票的“價值”基金。
李路說﹐兩週後他與芒格再度會面﹐以確保後者的聽證權。2004年初﹐李路創立了一個基金﹐自己投資400萬美元﹐又從其他投資者那裡籌集5,000萬美元。芒格的家族投資5,000萬﹐後來又投資3,800萬。李路與芒格達成的協議中有基金將不再向新投資者開放的內容。
李路獲得成功始於2002年首次投資比亞迪﹐當時比亞迪只是一家羽翼未豐的中國電池公司。比亞迪創始人出身貧寒﹐1995年用借來的30萬美元開創了這家公司。
比亞迪在香港證交所進行首次公開募股(IPO)後不久﹐李路就投資了這家公司。(比亞迪在美國“粉單”(Pink Sheets)市場交易﹐最近報每股6.90美元。)
李路創立自己的基金後﹐再次買進比亞迪股票﹐最終將與芒格共同經營的1.5億美元基金中很大一部分都投向了比亞迪﹐後者當時迅速發展﹐已經收購了一家破產的中國汽車製造商。芒格說﹐李路一開始只買了一點兒﹐後來比亞迪股票下跌時又買入更多﹐這是他的特點。
2008年﹐芒格還說服索科爾為伯克希爾調查比亞迪。索科爾去了中國﹐回到美國後﹐他與芒格一同勸說巴菲特加大對比亞迪的投資。9月﹐伯克希爾向比亞迪投資2.3億美元﹐收購了該公司10%的股份。
比亞迪的業務一直火爆。現在它已佔了全球用於手機的鋰電池市場近三分之一的份額。比亞迪更宏大的計劃包括電動汽車和混合動力車方面的業務。
作為中國最大的汽車廠商之一﹐比亞迪面臨的考驗在於能否實現其開發市場上能效最高的鋰電池的計劃﹐這種電池未來可能成為更強勁的動力來源。更有前景的是﹐鋰電池有可能用於存儲太陽能和風能等其他能源產生的電力。
芒格說﹐大型鋰電池將改變整個行業的狀況。
比亞迪是李路重點押注的對象。他是該公司的非正式顧問﹐並擁有約2.5%的股權。
李路的基金向比亞迪投資的4,000萬美元現在價值約4億美元。伯克希爾2008年投資的2.3億美元現在價值約15億美元。巴菲特、芒格、索科爾和李路﹐還有微軟創始人兼伯克希爾董事比爾•蓋茨(Bill Gates)計劃今年9月訪問中國並參觀比亞迪。
現在李路可以在有限制的條件下在中國旅行。但中國政府對他有何看法還不清楚。
李路拒絕透露基金的其他資產。雖然今年出現虧損﹐但這個規模6億美元的基金自2004年底創立以來已經增長了338%﹐年化回報率約30%﹐而標普500指數年化回報率不足1%。
李路對投資者說﹐他從世界杯觀賽經歷中汲取了一項教訓﹐他將自己的投資風格比作足球。他說﹐你有可能踢得非常賣力﹐但就是進不了球﹐但偶然之間──非常偶然──你得到一兩個好機會﹐從而踢進決定性的進球。
Susan Pulliam
Li Lu’s 2010 Lecture at Columbia
Bruce Greenwald: Warren Buffett says that when he retires, there are three people he would like to manage his money. First is Seth Klarman of the Baupost Group, who you will hear from later in the course. Next is Greg Alexander of the Sequoia Fund. Third is Li Lu. He happens to manage all of Charlie Munger’s money. I have a small investment with him and in four years it is up 400%.
[Applause]
Li Lu: Columbia is where my whole life in America started. I could barely speak the language. In Columbia it was where I had a new life. It was really in the Value Investing class where I got my career start. I was really worried about my student loan debt at the time and a friend told me about this class and said I need to see a lecture from Warren Buffett.
What I heard that night changed my life. He said three things:
1. A stock is not a piece of paper, it is a piece of ownership in a company.
2. You need a margin of safety so if you are wrong you don’t lose much.
3. In the market, most people are in it for the short term. It allows you a framework for dealing with the day to day volatility.
Those were three powerful concepts. I had never viewed the stock market like that. I viewed it negatively as a place made up of manipulators who were lining their own pockets. I embarked on an intensive two year study learning everything about Buffett.
Two years after that I bought my first stock. After I graduated I worked at an investment bank for a year and realized it was a mistake. I tried to start a fund but I didn’t have a track record. The first year I managed money I lost 19%.
Being a value investor means you look at the downside before looking at the upside. Before becoming an investor you need to look at how you can fail at this game. There are all sorts of ways you can fail. You need to examine who you are and see if you could be good at it. If you could ever find something you can do well that you really like — that will be your best investment. You will do better than competitors. If you can do it with intrinsic passion, that really over time will add enormous value to you.
Back to the game of investing. This concept of margin of safety is an essential concept to be a good investor. The future is unpredictable, you will always be dealt surprises, some positive most negative. You need to build in a level of safety so that whatever happens, you will not get crushed. If you can really successfully know what you are getting into, you can pretty much navigate. Most people are troubled by what they don’t know. The world is divided by those who know and those who don’t know. If you really know — you will not pull triggers like Wall St. traders. If you are truly intellectually honest, you would not do anything.
This class teaches you to know what you are getting into, especially accepting what things you don’t know. The game of investment is really continuous learning. Everything affects an investment, it constantly changes. You are not investing in the past but the accumulative cash flow of the future. You have to want to find a certain set up where you can know something that most people don’t know. There are plenty of things I don’t know but they don’t factor into the purchase because I am using a huge margin of safety. Buying a dollar at 50 cents. So if things turn against you, you will be okay. That is not easy. This business is brutally competitive. It is so impossible to know everything and know exactly what is going to happen to a business from now till the end that you really have to accept that what you don’t know.
Finding an edge really only comes from a right frame of mind and years of continuous study. But when you find those insights along the road of study, you need to have the guts and courage to back up the truck and ignore the opinions of everyone else. To be a better investor, you have to stand on your own. You just can’t copy other people’s insights. Sooner or later, the position turns against you. If you don’t have any insights into the business, when it goes from $100 to $50 you aren’t going to know if it will back to $100 or $200.
So this is really difficult, but on the other hand, the rewards are huge. Warren says that if you only come up with 10 good investments in your 40 year career, you will be extraordinarily rich. That’s really what it is. This shows how different value investing is than any other subject.
So how do you really understand and gain that great insight? Pick one business. Any business. And truly understand it. I tell my interns to work through this exercise – imagine a distant relative passes away and you find out that you have inherited 100% of a business they owned. What are you going to do about it? That is the mentality to take when looking at any business. I strongly encourage you to start and understand 1 business, inside out. That is better than any training possible. It does not have to be a great business, it could be any business. You need to be able to get a feel for how you would do as a 100% owner. If you can do that, you will have a tremendous leg up against the competition. Most people don’t take that first concept correctly and it is quite sad. People view it as a piece of paper and just trade because it is easy to trade. But if it was a business you inherited, you would not be trading. You would really seek out knowledge on how it should be run, how it works. If you start with that, you will eventually know how much that business is worth.
When I started in the business in 1997, it was in the middle of the Asian Financial Crisis. A few years later there was the Internet bubble. A couple years ago was the Great Crash of 2007 – 2008. They are billed as once in a century disasters but happen every few years. Every time it goes against you, your net worth or value of your investments might go down 50%. This is really where that insight and temperament comes in. In a sense, you have to have a certain confidence in your own judgement and not be swayed by other people’s views. It is not easy. But that is life. It is just a given. It happens to everyone. Berkshire had at least three times when the stock went down 50%. It happened to Carnegie too. It happened to Rockefeller. It happens to everyone. If you really made a mistake, it would not stop at 50% but go to 0.
This happens to even mighty companies. Look at the top 50 companies in America every 10 years. By the time 20-40 years go by, 2/3rds of them will be gone. By the time it goes to 100 years, there might be only a couple left. It’s just the way it is. Look at what happened to the once mighty General Motors. So thats why I’m saying is, investing is a continuous learning process because your investments are constantly changing
So for those of you that have curiosity and the temperament, this game couldn’t be better. Capitalism rewards people who are talented at capital allocator. So if you have the aptitude and temperament, it is the great game. If you don’t have that then I urge you not to go and become a nuisance. That is really what Wall Street did, they don’t really create anything they just move money around. Letting the financial industry get too big is bad for the economy, it is just as bad as getting addicted to casinos, drugs, and alcohol. None of them are really useful, they just transfer wealth. That is what I think happened on Wall Street over the last several decades. So avoid being harmful.
With that I am open to questions.
Q: Mohnish Pabrai recently spoke about his reluctance about investing in China due to the multiple accounting books / the possibility of fraud. How do you deal with this given your own investments in China?
Li Lu: Well, you know I think he is right. Every thing has an exception though. Just because a next door neighbor is a fraud doesn’t mean you are. That is one question to ask — whether you can trust the accounting and people running the business. That can have a huge impact on the business. I suggest you spend a lot of time looking at these factors, especially if you are investing for the long haul.
Q: Why did you decide to go into venture capital? How is that different than your other investing?
Li Lu: I always had this bent that I want to build a real business. I started a venture and it was really a lot of fun. Overall, it is a tougher game than simply investing in securities because you have to evolve to the day to day changes in operations and it is just not as easy to build great businesses. Every generation has a handful of great businesses that come from no where and come to dominate their fields. It is much more rewarding as an investor to pick those. Also, you are more likely to find managers much more capable than yourself. Overall, I learned a lot. I learned a lot in how businesses succeed and how businesses fail. It really was a lot of fun. I probably carried it too far — I eventually ran one of the businesses and it was of course a mistake.
Q: I read that when you look at an industry, you look at the most miserable failures of that industry to see whether you will invest in it. Can you talk a bit about that?
Li Lu: It goes back to understanding the business. Once you have that understanding you can extend it to understanding an industry. A certain industry might have characteristics that make it different than others. In certain industries you might have better prospects than others. Find the best of the players in the industry and the worst players. And see how they perform over time. And if the worst players perform reasonably well relative to the great players — that tells you something about the characteristics about the industry. That is not always the case but it is often the case. Certain industries are better than others.
So if you can understand a business inside out you can then eventually extend that to understanding an industry. If you can get that insight, it is enormously beneficial. If you can then concentrate that on a business with superior economics in an industry with superior economics with good management and you get them at the right price — the chances are that you can stay for a very long time.
Q: Did you have any specific example?
Li Lu: I have studied many over the years. As I have said, don’t copy other people’s insights because it doesn’t work. Automobiles are amazing. If you look at the early days it started with several players and concentrated with just a few players that became enormously profitable. Then they became miserable. You then see how the life cycle turns with new automakers in China and India. Everything has a reason. If you want a good idea — look at General Motors from the early days, look every 5 years and see how the performance metrics change. The Graham and Dodd Center should collect all the data and perform some kind of commentary on it.
Bruce Greenwald: Do you want me to give you the answer to that? In the 1960s, their return on capital was 46%. In the 1970s their return on capital was 28%. In the 1980s it was 9% in the 1990s it was 6%. You want to guess how negative it is now?
Li Lu: So that is really fascinating. If you have that data, the amount of insight that would yield would be astonishing. So instead of just accepting the conventional wisdom that the auto business is bad — that is just not true. Or if you say well those guys just unbelievable money machines — that is not true either. So if you can really examine those statistics and understand it that will give you an advantage for analyzing new situations like in China and India. That is really what turns me on. Understanding this gives you a tremendous leg up.
Q: I wanted to ask you about BYD. I heard that you thought it was important for them to introduce a model to the US and wanted to know why you thought that.
Li Lu: That might be a better question to ask the BYD chairman than myself. Well, If you are just talking about electric vehicles, you know the key — the heart and soul of the electric vehicle age the heart is the battery. There is the battery, electric motor, and the electric control control panel. The electric motor has been there for 100 years, control system is software that can be improved over time.
The battery is really where you get the biggest appreciation and is what determines the value of the electric vehicle. 100 years before the Model-T was introduced, the competition between electric vehicles and gasoline was not nearly as optimistic. Up and till then, 1/3rd of cars being produced were electric. It wasn’t until Rockefeller got oil extracted easily enough that it worked. Henry Ford was able to make the internal combustion work even though it wasted 85% of the energy. He was able to build the engine and produce automobiles that were cheap enough for people to buy and it took off. That is where you find the real winners.
Now, years later, we know that the way that oil is burned contributes to global warming. If it continues, the planet might still be here but all the human beings might not. Human beings have only been on the planet for a tiny bit of the earth’s history. So there are all sorts of good reasons for electric cars. Battery development has advanced so much that it is now comparable to the price and performance of traditional cars. So now with the help of companies like BYD, the balance is about to tilt towards where performance and price are getting to the level that makes them a desirable alternative. It will be desirable everywhere. Eventually, if you have a car that does all that, it will be sold everywhere.
Q: What about BYD versus others in the industry?
Li Lu: The market will determine that.
Q: Yeah – but why BYD versus others?
Li Lu: Well because we also studied all those other guys. We will see when the winner emerges whether we are right or wrong.
Q: Right – but what did you look at to reach that view?
Li Lu: There are a lot of people who have worked over 100 years making great cars. The technology for building a traditional car has been refined enough to where it can be learned in a short period. The place we are still seeing a curve of continuous rapid improvement is with the batteries for cars. Whoever is leading the charge will have a major advantage. There is really only one company that is a leader in battery manufacturing and automobile manufacturing. There is only one company. To put this together you need a Ford to put that together. So far those two elements need to be put together. It is not an easy process.
Q: So you went to BYD in 2005 and then you brought Berkshire as well. I saw that you sold a small amount of your BYD position at the end of last year. Was it just rebalancing? Can I just wanted to get your thoughts on that.
Li Lu: Actually I started my BYD position in 2002. I sold a small amount of shares because an investor of mine had an emergency redemption.
Q: We read your profile online. I had a question – do you have any problems when trying to invest in China?
Li Lu: Yeah I do have some difficulty. I did not really see a factory plant at BYD until the end of 2008. I really did not have a better understanding till then. That really causes you to question what it is before you make an investment. With investing, you have to work with imperfect information because you are buying a piece of the future. I did not really get a chance to get more information because the problem in Asia till much later but it did not stop me from making my investment decision. So there is a point, where if you have enough margin of safety– that is why I kept coming back to the elementary concept of margin of safety– you can allow much more uncertainty and unknowns. So the answer of the question is does that stop you from making the investment? No.
Q: So I did some research on lithium ion batteries, and I saw that BYD has a manufacturing advantage with consumer batteries. But I saw that automobile batteries are much more complex. I did not think that the idea of a good consumer battery manufacturer + an automobile maker made much sense. So when Buffett looked at the stock maybe it was a better deal but today it is this dream of vehicles that is really priced in. It does not feel like a good value investor stock. So why would you own it today?
Li Lu: Well that is interesting. One of the most fascinating things about being an investor is that surprises are part of the game. When you get into situations like BYD, you see lots of good surprises. Chuanfu and his team have this fabulous culture, everything people thought they knew turned out to be a few years late. He got into battery manufacturing in that particular way because he really had no other option. He had no money, he only had $300,000 in venture capital funding before IPO and that was it. He raised money in an IPO and Buffett gave him $200M, now they have 160,000 employees. $6-7B in revenues, $500M in net profit. It is amazing. So he has this ability to adapt in a competitive environment. He has demonstrated that ability again again and again. The way he does automation is far cheaper than anyone else and more reliable. He continues to surprise me with his ingenuity, to figure out ways to do something better than everyone else. What he is currently doing is very different than what everyone else has done. At the end of the day, you might look at what he has done.
So how do you look at it as an investor with imperfect information? Well I suggest you look at what he has accomplished. 8 years ago I had no idea they would go into the automobile or laptop or cellphone battery business. So that demonstrates how he is. This investment is not easy to understand because it is changing so fast, at such a large scale. An almost unheard of speed. Their manufacturing capabilities will double soon. This year they will hire 10,000 college graduates, 8 or 9 thousand engineers. The scale is almost unparalleled. So this is why the study of history, of all the great corporations will give you a good insight in seeing what will happen with BYD. I suggested that we start with GM and analyze its performance every 5 years for 100 years to understand at least one aspect of BYD’s business.
Q: One investor came in and said talking to management is a waste of time. They will say what you want them to say. Obviously it sounds like you don’t agree with that. What do you think? Will you pay a premium for a business with a moat?
Li Lu: There is no general rule. The key in investing is to know what you know and know what you don’t know. You can know about management teams without meeting with them. Every situation is slightly different. So I come back to the point that if you know enough on other things that there is enough margin of safety. Even if you meet with management, you may not learn something. Obviously, actions speak louder. You want to see what they have done. Everything being equal, the more you know about management, the more honest and upfront they are, the more motive they have, the better the situation is and the deeper the discount. You have to analyze it all. The key to analyzing it is you have to ask: do I really know what I think I know, do I really know what I don’t know? If you can’t answer that question, chances are you are gambling.
Q: What kind of preparation do you do before meeting a management team?
Li Lu: I don’t really have a set method. Because I usually am just curious about the business and don’t know a lot. So you are prepared and not prepared. If you are really curious, you want to learn more and study it more. When working at a hedge fund or mutual fund, you are expected to learn a business in one week. You can’t truly understand everything about a business in one week. It took me 10 years and I am still learning new things about BYD. It is a continuous learning process. You could spend a lifetime studying a business or industry, but in a few seconds I can tell you whether or not I like it. You want to build knowledge by continually learning. There is not set preparation.
Q: Recently, Jim Chanos gave us his thesis on the China Syndrome with there possibly being a bubble.
Li Lu: Well, it is too big of a question for me. I don’t know
Q: 20 years ago you said you challenged conventional wisdom in China. Out of curiosity, in terms of value investing what do you challenge in the conventional wisdom?
Li Lu: Well, the fundamental philosophy of value investing is very sound. Its basically the three things:
1. A stock is not a piece of paper, it is a piece of ownership in a company.
2. You need a margin of safety so if you are wrong you don’t lose much.
3. In the market, most people are in it for the short term. It allows you a framework for dealing with the day to day volatility.
That is really an intelligent approach. So therefor any intelligent investing is really value investing. There is a certain level of intellectual honesty. If you have all that insight going into analyzing businesses I don’t have any arguments with it.
Q: What is your point of view on long / short positions in value investing?
Li Lu: The most profitable kind of investing is long term investing. You want to allow the time that it might take because you don’t know when the market will catch on. If you can find a business with good management with good industry fundamentals blowing it forward, you have a good opportunity and you can save money on taxes.
A short cannot be a fundamentally long term position. In the long game, the upside is unlimited. Your downside is 100%. In shorting it is opposite. Shorting is also essentially borrowing, so you need money and time on your side. If time is not on your side, you can be right but lose all your money. The best kind of short usually has some kind of fraud. In those situations, management is determined to keep the fraud. Look at Bernie Madoff, 20 years time. You cannot afford to borrow money for 20 years. So shorting is a short term game. When those positions go against you, there is huge leverage that can utterly crush you.
In theory, long / short is okay, but if you are trading all the time you need to be in tune with all the things moving the market. None of them might be fundamental to the actual business. So you spend all your time chasing noise than studying a long term situation. If you cannot concentrate on things in the long term, and spend all your time thinking about the short term, you will not be able to develop the kinds of insights necessary to identify great investments.
From time to time, you will lose some money on paper. But it is just part of the game. This is why I closed long / short. You know I went through three bubbles. The Asian Financial Crisis, the Internet Bubble, and this most recent financial crisis. The biggest mistake I made is not being able to pick up undervalued companies where I had a unique insight but was tied up with this whole long / short thing. The money I left on the table is still adding up. I am still paying for those mistakes.
Q: In a bull market environment, how do you re-evaluate your thesis?
Li Lu: I don’t ever want to profit from a bubble. Soros does that, that is just not my game. I don’t profess any ability to understand how long a crowd will buy into a bubble. I invest in things that appear to be compelling values that continues. So that is why this game is a continuous learning process – because everything affecting the investment is constantly changing. Including the price. Including the prospects and elements of business success. You really do want to never stop learning. This game looks to be easy but it is not easy.
Q: Given your focus on international investments, how do you think about diversifying your investments regionally?
Li Lu: First of all, I did not really specialize in international investments. I started off doing most of my investments in the US and Canada. In recent years, I just find better bargains outside of it. One of the great things about being an investor is you can look anywhere and find great pockets of opportunities. You cannot do that as a venture capitalist as I experienced myself. So you can look anywhere for opportunities. I do not take a regional approach to diversification. I have views towards certain countries and currencies, but it is not the driving force for a potential investment. If you have your fundamental things right, if you happen to have macro economic factors behind you, you can run a great wave.
Q: How is your investment style different today than when you started the fund?
Li Lu: A lot of things have changed. One bonus about this profession is you get better over time. Most professions, as you get older, you get out of the game. Take the example of competitive sports. If you are a figure skater or gymnast, after your teenage years you are out of the game. With investing, if you are doing it the right way, you get better over time. Your knowledge accumulates exponentially. When I look back at everything I have done, I would have done it all slightly differently, but that is because I am better at it today. So if you approach it in a fundamentally sound way, as you mature, you become better and better. That process and progression is like compounding money. In fact, you can compound knowledge faster than money. If you truly love this game, I would suggest that you don’t take short cuts. It might take longer but it is more rewarding.
Q: What is the difference between being a top political criminal in China versus a hedge fund manager today (referring to the ire directed at Wall Street)?
Li Lu: I don’t consider myself a criminal. I don’t think China considers me a criminal. What I think we are doing today with our investment in BYD in China is really helping China march towards a modern era of prosperity. BYD is providing a solution to both China and the US, to migrate from the past to a way that gets us out of the unsustainable carbon age that we live in. Global warming is a vital concern to every human being, so China is providing a great contribution to everybody with BYD. America has had a great history of invention and here is a great company in China that is about to make a major contribution to human civilization with cheap electric vehicles and solar power.
Ultimately we will have to get our energy from the sun. Most of the energy, even fossil fuels (plants that die and then go into the ground), all originally come from the sun. So if you can figure out a way to take energy from the sun and power vehicles, while using batteries to store it, inexpensively — will really make renewable energy power everything. The combination of those things holds the key to the future of industrial civilization that we are about to embark on. We didn’t set out with BYD with this in mind, it just happened that way. With great companies, it only looks logical in retrospect. Think about how Bill Gates started Microsoft. I don’t think he knew up front that he would take the entire market — at that time it did not exist. It is the same way with our investment in BYD. Ultimately, I think finding an inexpensive way to store energy that we harness from the sun will be a huge contribution for both China and the US, but more broadly our entire civilization.
2010年5月25日
Jason Zweig在CFA年會訪問Seth Klarman的文字稿
Seth-Klarman-CFA-Conference-Notes -
JZ: In Margin of Safety, you were critical of Indexing, is that still the case?
SK: There is no perfect answer. Yes, I still believe indexing is a horrible idea. Stocks trade up when they’re added to the index so the index investor is paying up. I’m more likely to buy the companies kicked out of the index. For the average person, however, they don’t do enough research to own individual stocks. The idea of owning stocks for the long run is a disservice to investors, because many are not there for the long run. Many got out in 2008 when they should have been buying, because the entry point matters most. Transaction costs and Taxes don’t matter if the market goes nowhere. I’m very worried about another 10 years of zero or low returns since the market has run up so fast.
Jason Zweig問Seth Klarman對指數投資的看法,SK認為這其實沒有什麼標準答案,但他認為指數投資是一個很爛的想法,當股票被選為指數的成份股時,股價就會上漲,這是指數投資人投入資金所造成的。他寧願買被踢出指數的股票。然而,對於那些追求平均的人來說,他們沒有足夠的研究去持有個股。而持有股票很長一段期間對投資人也只是幫倒忙而已,因為有很多股票並不會長期維持相同的水準。很多投資人在2008年出場了,但是當時他們應該要買股票才對,其實進場的點是最重要的。交易成本和稅其實並不重要,如果市場沒有前途。SK很擔心我們會面臨另一個完全零報酬或是報酬很低的十年,尤其這次的復甦漲勢相當的快速。
JZ: In Margin of Safety, you said commodities were not investments since they do not produce cash flows, one possible exception being gold. Do you still feel this way?
SK: I haven’t changed my mind, but that statement was in reference to rare stamps, or fine art, etc. Valuing collectibles based on a future sale to a greater fool is speculating. There is no way to analyze what it will be worth in the future. Land is complicated because it will be valuable to future buyers and it can have cash flows. Gold has been thought of as a store of value but it is just a commodity and therefore it is a speculation. I own gold because I want exposure to a devaluation of all paper monies.
Jason Zweig問Seth Klarman對投資商品的看法,是不是跟Margin of Safety書中說的一樣,認為商品不會產生現金流,並不屬於投資,唯一可能的例外是黃金。SK並沒有改變他的看法,不過對商品的看法並不是這麼簡單。如果你想對收藏品進行估價,並希望將來可以用高價賣給另一個更笨的傻瓜,這樣作就是投機,因為沒有任何方法可以去估計這些東西將來值多少錢。土地就比較複雜了,因為土地未來的確會有價值,而且可以產生現金流。而黃金一向被認為可以儲存價值,但是其實到頭來終究也只是一種商品,所以是一種投機。SK持有黃金只是因為認為所有紙類貨幣都會貶值。
JZ: What are the top asset classes for the next decade?
SK: Ask Jeremy Grantham! We’re opportunistic, we’ll buy what’s out of favor, what’s in financial distress, in litigation, in trouble, whatever.
Jason Zweig問Seth Klarman未來十年會投資什麼,SK說他是機會主義者,什麼失寵了、遇到金融危機或是有訴訟事件、有麻煩的都是他們要投資的。
JZ: Can you define a Value Stock and what is your average holding period?
SK: As for a Holding Period, we buy expecting to hold a bond to maturity and a stock forever. Now we may turn over quicker if there’s rapid appreciation and the return from the current price doesn’t seem to compensate for the risks anymore. There’s no such thing as a Value Company. Price is all that matters. At some price, an asset is a buy, at another it’s a hold, and at another it’s a sell.
Jason Zweig問Seth Klarman怎麼定義價值型公司,SK回答說其實沒有所謂的價值型公司,價格才是重點。在某些價格,他們會買進某些資產,在另一些價格他們會持有這些資產,但是也會在其他價格的時候賣掉這些資產。雖然他們期望可以持有債券到期或是永遠持有股票,但是他們可能會更快速的作週轉,因為現在資產的價格可能不夠好到足以抵銷他們所冒的風險。
JZ: When will we see a re-issue of Margin of Safety?
SK: I have no immediate plans, but I do want to bring it back with either a companion manual or fresh introduction. I have no time to write it, however, so it’s not coming anytime soon. It’s not intentionally out of print, it happened accidentally. I’d like to raise money for charity somehow when I do bring it back.
問到會不會再版Margin of Safety這本經典的書,SK說會但是目前沒有規劃。
JZ: Any Book Recommendations (besides Margin of Safety and Security Analysis, of course)?
SK: Read as much as you can about the markets, economy, and financial history. Never stop reading. Specific book recommendations include The Intelligent Investor, Greenblatt’s You Can Be A Stock Market Genius, Whitman’s Aggressive Conservative Investor, Anything from Jim Grant (he’s a great thinker, even if his predictions may not turn out right), Roger Lowenstein has not written a bad book, anything from him. Also Michael Lewis, who also hasn’t written a bad book either, but specifically MoneyBall which will go down as a definitive book on investing. Also Too Big to Fail is good.
JZ: I’ll add How to Lie with Statistics.
這是兩位價值型投資的重要人物推薦的書籍。Margin of Safety我好不容易取得了這本書,下次Blog辦活動再當獎品送給大家。
2010年1月31日
Fairholme改變持股策略
我在部落格中曾多次提到The Fairholme Fund (FAIRX),並不是在推薦這檔主動管理的價值型基金,而是持續在觀察這樣一檔相當具有知名度,而且標榜價值型投資,過去績效又很好的基金是怎樣看待市場的。去年十月才轉了基金的經理人對市場的看法,而現在Morning Star則報導了這檔基金對持股的策略有所轉變。看樣子,價值投資的主動管理基金,策略和看法的改變還是相當快速。
而整個持股的最大變化是,減持了很多生計醫療股,像是PFE,卻增持了BNI和C,其中BNI是跟隨巴菲特腳步或是先前一步不得而知,但是對花旗的增持倒是讓我挺訝異的,畢竟花旗並不是價值型公司,而巴菲特本人如此熱愛金融股的情況下,卻也點名花旗狀況很不好,為何買入花旗,是個有趣的地方,再觀察看看,畢竟我是把花旗當投機用的penny stock。
該基金去年再度打敗大盤,同時過去十年的年化報酬率超過12%,其實表現很好,而過去十年的S&P 500年化報酬率是-1.11%。基金的最大持股是Sears,BRK.B排名第二,都在10%左右,如果以最近這兩週BRK.B的暴漲來看,今年該基金表現可能又要勝過大盤了。Berkshire Hathaway (BRK.B) moved up to be the fund's second-biggest holding with Sears Holding (SHLD), AmeriCredit (ACF), and St. Joe (JOE) remaining in the top five. In the last six months, the fund materially disposed of shares in former top holding Pfizer (PFE) as well as selling shares in American Express (AXP), General Dynamics (GD), Northrop Grumman (NOC), Boeing (BA), and UnitedHealth (UNH).
The fund's cash stake dropped to 16.2% from 22.4% as of August 31, 2009, and Berkowitz picked up shares in new holdings Burlington Northern (BNI), Citigroup (C), and Winthrop Realty Trust (FUR).
而整個持股的最大變化是,減持了很多生計醫療股,像是PFE,卻增持了BNI和C,其中BNI是跟隨巴菲特腳步或是先前一步不得而知,但是對花旗的增持倒是讓我挺訝異的,畢竟花旗並不是價值型公司,而巴菲特本人如此熱愛金融股的情況下,卻也點名花旗狀況很不好,為何買入花旗,是個有趣的地方,再觀察看看,畢竟我是把花旗當投機用的penny stock。
2009年10月4日
奉行價值投資法的基金經理人對市場的看法
The Fairholme Fund是以價值投資法作為管理策略的著名基金,從1999年發行以來,到現在已經年,獲利達到225.88%,年化報酬率也有12.87%,比起S&P 500的-1.53%年化報酬率要好上許多,即使去年的大海嘯,S&P 500過去一年下跌6.91%,這檔基金也只有下跌2.45%。這個基金的經理人Bruce Berkowitz在出席一場研討會的時候回答股東一些問題,我覺得很值得價值投資法的投資人仔細閱讀和思考。
The Fairholme Fund目前的投資焦點擺在Health Care類股,最大持股是瑞輝藥廠(Pfizer)。而Bruce Berkowitz認為對抗通膨最好的方法就是找到公司擁有大而持續成長的現金流,持有他們的股票。而對於新興市場,他則認為他不想碰他不懂的市場,況且美國已經有許多好公司了。而關於Berkshire,他過去曾經認為這家公司太大了,經營者(巴菲特)太老,並且巴菲特自己也說過不要預期Berkshire可以打敗S&P 500,所以他賣掉Berkshire的持股。不過今年初Berkshire價格很漂亮的時候,他又買回來了。對於BRK和LUK這兩家公司的管理團隊,Bruce Berkowitz都認為值得尊敬。
而價值投資人未必要買The Fairholme Fund,但是參考The Fairholme Fund的持股則可能對於投資很有幫助。
PS:這檔基金年費用率為1.01%,最低投資金額為2500美元,至於要怎麼購買,可以詢問你的券商或是直接洽詢該基金,我不確定海外投資人能否有機會購買。
標籤:
Value Investing
2009年5月26日
價值投資者的部落格
- The Inoculated Investor:雖然是很新的Blog,不過裡面有很多豐富的內容,像是LUK或是BRK的股東年會會議記錄,而作者自己也是分析師,還正打算繼續進修!
- Value Investing World:價值投資領域經營比較長久而著名的Blog,他的文章和Link都很值得仔細去閱讀。
- Value Investing News:價值投資相關新聞的收集網站。
- Todd Sullivan's – ValuePlays:也是經營很久了,不過有點雜。
- Reflections on Value Investing:價值投資的一些文章發表與收集。
- SimoleonSense:以價值投資、行為財務學、神經經濟學....等為主題的專業網站。
- Contrarian Value Investing Blog:這個網站也是以價值投資法為主,然後用一個Magic Formula Stocks的方法來篩選股票,此外也有Doddsville和Seth Klarman以及Buffett的相關文章。
- Vinvesting.com:這個網站比較像是論壇或是社群的形式,以價值投資和巴菲特、坦伯頓等人的理念為討論主題。
- The Graham Investor:這個部落格主要也是以葛拉漢投資理念為主的網站,也可以用所謂的葛拉漢價值指數來篩選股票。
- Graham And Doddsville:這個部落格主要以葛拉漢與陶徳投資理念為主的網站,從首頁的證券分析一書的照片就可以看得出來,價值投資和證券分析是這個站的主題。
標籤:
Value Investing,
Website
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